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The aim of this thesis is to study the security of two particular quantum communi-
cation protocols. We want to investigate what is the maximum amount of channel
noise for which the protocols can still be secure. We do this by using well known
bounds for limiting the information that an eavesdropper can obtain.
The first protocol that we study is a direct communication protocol using two-
qubit states. We find the security threshold by analyzing the protocol in an en-
tanglement based setting. The Holevo bound was used to put an upper bound on
the information of an eavesdropper. To arrive at a manageable optimisation prob-
lem, we restrict the eavesdropper’s attack strategy such that the noise introduced
will be unbiased. Furthermore, we also impose some additional constraints on
the eavesdropper that arises from the symmetry of the protocol. After doing this
we then optimise the remaining parameters to arrive at the eavesdropper’s optimal
strategy and find out what is the maximum amount of information she can obtain.
Once the eavesdropper’s maximum information is known, the security threshold
for secure communication was obtained by comparing that information with the
information between the legitimate communicating parties.
The second protocol studied is a continuous variable quantum key distribu-
tion protocol using post-selection. For this protocol, we investigate the maximum
xii
amount of information the eavesdropper can get under individual and collective
attacks in the presence of Gaussian excess noise in the channel. By providing the
eavesdropper with additional information, we can use known results on the acces-
sible information for pure input states to bound the eavesdropper’s information.
For individual attacks, Levitin’s result on the optimal measurement was used while
for collective attacks, Holevo’s bound was used to arrive at an upper bound for the
eavesdropper’s information. From this we can then arrive at the post-selection re-
gion where the legitimate communicating parties have more information than the
eavesdropper. We can then find the maximum amount of noise that the protocol
can tolerate before the eavesdropper knows too much and the protocol fails.
xiii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Quantum key distribution was one of the first real applications of quantum infor-
mation in the commercial world. In fact apart from the quantum random number
generator there is still no other real application of quantum information.
In 1994 Shor discovered an efficient factoring algorithm that works on a quan-
tum machine [50]. That discovery threatens to jeopardise existing classical cryp-
tography protocols whose security depends on the mathematical complexity of
factoring large numbers. However as far as we know, there has not been much
success in coherently manipulating more than a handful of qubits. In 2001, the
first successful quantum factorising machine was able to factorise 15 [56]. By
manipulating seven qubits, the group from Stanford and IBM reported that the
prime factors of 15 are 3 and 5. In 2007, optical implementations of a compiled
version of Shor’s algorithm for factoring the same number were reported by two
independent groups [31,37]. This record has not been beaten. So for now at least,
classical cryptography is still safe and not under much threat.
2But when the day comes that our capable scientists and engineers succeed
in building a quantum factorising machine of decent size, many of the current
cryptography protocols will become insecure. In fact the successful labs will be
able to decipher not only current secret messages, but also all old messages that
were encrypted using the compromised protocols.
1.1 Quantum key distribution
It will then be time to look for a more secure cryptography protocol. One protocol
that is not challenged by Shor’s factoring algorithm is the one-time pad protocol
of 1917 which Shannon proved to be unbreakable in 1945 during World War II.
However the one-time pad is not a replacement for modern cryptography protocols
such as the public key cryptography. This is because in the one-time pad, all the
different parties that wish to communicate must a priori share a string of random
keys. The amount of shared random keys required must be equal to the length
of the message that each party wishes to communicate. In other words everyone
must have a trusted channel with everyone else in which to distribute the keys.
This is where quantum key distribution comes in. It acts as a trusted courier in the
one-time pad protocol.
The first published mention of using quantum mechanics for ensuring security
was in Wiesner’s 1983 paper where he proposed a quantum currency that is im-
possible to counterfeit [59]. A year later, the first quantum cryptography protocol
was proposed by Bennett and Brassard [7]. This has become known as the BB84
protocol.
3For a more comprehensive review of the field, the reader can refer to review
articles on the topic [21,35,45]. In this introduction, we shall restrict ourselves to
giving a brief explanation of the BB84 protocol as well as a quantum key distri-
bution protocol that uses continuous degrees of freedom.
1.1.1 BB84 protocol
The communicating parties are traditionally called Alice and Bob. In a quantum
key distribution protocol, Alice wishes to establish a string of secret keys with
Bob. In the BB84 protocol, Alice will send to Bob one of four possible qubit
states chosen at random. These four states are the horizontally/vertically polarised
states and the diagonal/anti-diagonal states. The horizontal and diagonal states are
assigned the bit 0, while the vertical and anti-diagonal states are assigned the bit 1.
Bob will measure the qubits he received in either the horizontal–vertical basis
or the diagonal–anti-diagonal basis. He chooses one of the two bases at random.
After Bob’s measurements are completed, Alice will announce through an authen-
ticated public channel the basis in which she encoded her signals.
Every time that Bob measures in the same basis as Alice encodes, and this
happens on average half of the time, Alice and Bob will share a perfectly corre-
lated bit. The other half of the time when their bases do not match, Alice and Bob
expect no correlation at all. In this sense, the efficiency of the protocol is half. On
average, half of the encoding Alice sends will end up as the secret keys.
After authenticating themselves, Alice and Bob then use a fraction of the mea-
surement outcomes to check that they indeed see the correlations that were ex-
pected. This check establishes that the quantum channel between them is secure.
4The remaining matching-basis bits are then processed before being used as keys
for the one-time pad protocol.
In this sense the protocol is not deterministic. In the perfect channel half of
the data Alice sent will still be lost. This can be overcome if Bob has access to a
quantum memory. He can safely store the qubits that Alice sent. Then at a later
time, when Alice is sure that Bob has already received the qubits sent, Alice tells
Bob the basis for each qubit. Bob then measures in the correct basis to recover the
message.
The security of the original BB84 protocol stems from the fact that if someone
(we call her Eve) tries to eavesdrop on the keys, she will not know a priori the
basis that Alice encodes. As such, any attempt that she makes to learn something
about the keys will induce noise on the signals that Bob receive. Subsequently
when Alice and Bob check their correlations, they will find that it is less that what
it should be. In this way, the channel can be characterised. The amount of noise
they see is related to the amount of information an eavesdropper can extract. Alice
and Bob can then protect their keys from the eavesdropper by using suitable error-
correcting and privacy amplification schemes. If they find that the channel is too
noisy, they would abandon the protocol altogether and find a different channel to
use.
Since 1984, many different protocols including numerous variations of the
original BB84 protocols have been proposed. Some of these protocols have been
implemented in the laboratory.
51.1.2 Continuous variable key distribution
A different class of protocols uses continuous degrees of freedom instead of dis-
crete level systems like qubits. The earliest continuous variable key distribution
protocol was presented in 1999 by Ralph [40] and Hillery [26]. These protocols
use squeezed states to ensure the security of the communication. One protocol
that only uses coherent states was Grosshans and Grangier’s coherent state pro-
tocol published in 2002 [23]. We shall explain that protocol in some detail in
chapter 12. This protocol suffers from the 3 dB loss limit. For a transmission loss
of greater than 50% the protocol becomes insecure.
Two different methods were introduced to overcome the 3 dB loss limit: post-
selection [52] and reverse reconciliation [22]. In post-selection protocols, Alice
and Bob would only select data points where they have an information advantage
over Eve. In a reverse reconciliation protocol, Alice corrects her keys to have the
same values as Bob’s. Both protocols and their variants have been successfully
implemented in laboratories.
1.2 Information theory
In this section, we define some terms and recap some useful results from informa-
tion theory that will be used in this thesis. The proofs of the results can be found
in standard textbooks [6, 15].
61.2.1 Classical entropy
Given a random variable A, where the outcome ai has a probability p(ai) for i ∈





p(ai) log p(ai) . (1.1)
The logarithm is taken in base 2. This measures the bits of information we gain, on
average, when we learn about a letter of A. Equivalently, it gives the least average
number of bits required to identify a letter of A. In other words, to unambiguously
transmit a message of length M, say:
{a2,a4,aN ,a1,a2, . . . ,a4}︸ ︷︷ ︸
M entries
, (1.2)
there exists (sometimes only when M tends to infinity) a suitable encoding scheme
in which we can just send M×H(A) bits of information. In this sense, H(A)/ logN
is also the best compression limit for the random variable A. This is Shannon’s
noiseless coding theorem [49].
1.2.2 Von Neumann entropy
The von Neumann entropy is the quantum analogue of Shannon entropy. Given a
quantum state represented by the density operator ρ, the von Neumann entropy of
7ρ is defined as




where λn are the non zero eigenvalues of ρ. Again, suppose Alice sends a message
with M letters, say:
{|ψ2〉 , |ψ4〉 , |ψN〉 , |ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉 , . . . , |ψ4〉}︸ ︷︷ ︸
M entries
, (1.5)
where each letter is chosen at random from the ensemble of pure states |ψi〉 with





|ψi〉 p(ψi)〈ψi| . (1.6)
To reliably transmit this whole quantum state, there exist an encoding scheme
in which Alice can just send M× S(ρ) qubits (in the limit of large M). This is
Schumacher’s quantum noiseless coding theorem [47].
1.2.3 Mutual information
Consider a noisy channel in which Alice sends Bob some classical signals ai with
probabilities p(ai). When Alice sends the signal ai, Bob obtains the measurement





The mutual information I(A,B) measures how much one random variable A
can tell us about another random variable B. It gives the maximum value for the
8average information transmitted to Bob per bit that Alice sends. Alice and Bob
will be able to attain this if they use a suitable encoding and decoding scheme
(which might be available only in the asymptotic limit of infinite signal length).
The mutual information is given by the difference between the entropy of Al-
ice’s distribution (before Bob’s measurement) and the entropy of Alice’s distribu-
tion conditioned on Bob’s outcomes.
I(A,B) = H(A)−H(A|B) . (1.7)
What this says is that the amount of information transmitted to Bob is equal to
the amount of information initially contained in Alice’s distribution minus the
amount of information that is left in Alice’s distribution after Bob has performed
his measurement.
In terms of the probabilities, the entropy of Alice’s distribution is
H(A) =−∑
i
p(ai) log p(ai) . (1.8)
Now conditioned on Bob obtaining an outcome b j, entropy of Alice’s distribution
would be
H(A|B = b j) =−∑
i
p(ai|b j) log p(ai|b j) . (1.9)
9On average, Alice’s entropy conditioned on Bob’s outcomes would be
H(A|B) = ∑
j








which is the chain rule for joint entropy. H(A,B) is the joint entropy of A and B.
The mutual information between Alice and Bob is then
I(A,B) = H(A)+H(B)−H(A,B) , (1.13)
symmetric between Alice and Bob. The relationship between the entropies H(A),
H(B), H(A,B), H(A|B), H(B|A) and the mutual information I(A,B) is expressed
in the Venn diagram in figure 1.1.
1.2.4 Accessible information and Holevo quantity
Now if instead of sending classical signals, Alice sends Bob signals using quan-
tum states through a noisy quantum channel. The message that Alice sends is from
the classical random variable A. Bob measures every quantum state individually
using some fixed quantum measurement apparatus Π. After the measurement is
completed, this apparatus gives a classical outcome for each quantum state. We
now have a classical joint probability distribution (A,B) between Alice and Bob.






Figure 1.1: Venn diagram representing the relationship between entropy and mu-
tual information. H(A) and H(B) are depicted by the whole circles. H(A,B) is
the union of the two circles.
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If Bob uses a different measurement scheme ˜Π, he may end up with a different
value of mutual information. The accessible information Iacc is defined as the
maximum of I(A,B) over all possible measurement apparatus.
Given the state that Alice sends and the a priori probabilities, the task of find-
ing the accessible information is in general not easy. An algorithm to approach
this problem numerically was proposed in [57].
There are however bounds that bound the accessible information from above.
One of them is the Holevo quantity. The accessible information is bounded by the
Holevo quantity,
Iacc ≤ S(ρ)−∑ piS(ρi)≡ χ({piρi}) , (1.14)
where ρi are Alice’s quantum signals and pi are the a priori probabilities for each
ρi. The state ρ = ∑i piρi is the statistical mixture that Bob receives.
1.3 Overview of the thesis
This objective of this thesis is to investigate the security of two particular quantum
communication protocols when implemented in a noisy channel. It is organised
as follows.
In chapter 2 we state the general security criteria for quantum cryptography.
These criteria will be used in both protocols. Following this the thesis is divided
into two parts.
The first part is concerned with a direct communication quantum communi-
cation protocol that utilises two qubits to transmit a single classical bit [3–5]. In
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chapter 3, we present this protocol. Chapter 4 looks at a particular intercept and
resend attack on the protocol. Chapter 5 considers a more general attack by con-
sidering an equivalent entanglement based protocol. Chapter 6 formulates the
optimisation problem in terms of the matrix representations of Eve’s ancillary sta-
tes. In chapter 7 we define a basis between Alice and Bob so that the constraints
on Eve can be written down explicitly. In chapter 8, we solve the optimisation
problem for simple cases when there is no noise in the channel and also when
there is so much noise that the state between Alice and Bob becomes separable.
Chapter 9 solves the general case for arbitrary noise level. In order to make the
problem more tractable, we had to make some symmetry assumptions on Eve’s
attack. In chapter 10, we present a conclusion and an outlook for possible future
works.
In appendix A, we show how to construct an equivalent entanglement based
protocol for an arbitrary channel between Alice and Bob. Appendix B lists down
explicitly the 64 constraints on Eve’s ancillary states for a chosen Alice–Bob ba-
sis. Appendix C gives the Schmidt decomposition of Eve’s purification between
Alice–Bob and Eve.
The second part of the thesis begins with a review on continuous variable
Gaussian states in chapter 11. Chapter 12 provides an example of one of the
earliest continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols. This protocol
suffers from the 3 dB loss limit. In chapter 13, we introduce the actual protocol
that will be studied. This protocol uses post-selection to overcome the 3 dB loss
limit. Chapter 14 reviews and extends work that was done on the protocol in the
presence of vacuum noise. In chapter 15, we study the security of the protocol
when there is thermal noise in the channel. In studying this, we need to compute
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the inner products between Eve’s ancillary states which is obtained by performing
the straightforward but lengthy Gaussian integrations. These inner products are
computed in appendix E. In chapter 16 we calculate some numerical values for
useful information between Alice and Bob for a specific channel with transmission
loss of 0.5. Finally in chapter 17 we summarise the results of this part and present
an outlook for future works.
Original work in the thesis: The contents of chapters 1 and 2 are a compila-
tion of existing works. The protocol presented in chapter 3 is not new and was
first published in 2002 [3]. However the experimental setup for the protocol in
section 3.3 has never been published elsewhere. The biased intercept and resend
attack in section 4.2 is a particular case of the optimal scheme presented in [4].
The analysis and results for the unbiased intercept and resend attack in section 4.3
are original. For the remainder of part one of thesis, the tools used for analysing
the security are not new, but their application to this protocol is original.
In part two of the thesis, chapters 11 and 12 are a review of existing works
on Gaussian states and continuous variable key distributions. Chapters 13 and 14
are elaborations of the protocol published in [52]. Except for figure 14.3, all
the other figures in chapter 14 are original. The analytical formula for the post-
selection region in section 14.3.2 is also new. Section 14.4 extends the work
in [52] to a collective attack. The contents in chapters 15 and 16 were done
in collaboration with the authors of [1, 54]. The general input state for Eve and
the formulation of her state in terms of a covariance matrix in section 15.1 are
original and has not been published elsewhere. The analytical formulas for Eve’s
inner products presented in 15.1.2 were contributed by me. All the calculations
and results in sections 15.4 and 15.5 are original work. The analytical formula for
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the reconciliation direction in section 15.4, the formula for the asymptotic limit
of the post-selection region and the cubic equation that gives the noise threshold
in section 15.5 were also my contributions. Chapter 16 elaborates on the theory




Security criteria for quantum key
distribution protocols
In this thesis, we will be investigating the security of two quantum communication
protocols. The first protocol is a discrete variable protocol involving a two-qubit
system while the second protocol is a continuous variable protocol where the sig-
nals are transmitted using single-mode coherent states. We will use the same
methods to study both protocols.
In this chapter, we shall discuss in general how much information an eaves-
dropper would be able to get in a generic quantum key distribution protocol.
Throughout this thesis, we assume ideal situations for Alice and Bob. In par-
ticular, we assume that Alice has a perfect random number generator and that Eve
does not have access to Alice and Bob’s labs. We also assume that Alice and Bob
have access to a public but authenticated classical channel. Eve can listen to the
channel but she cannot tamper with it.
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Furthermore, the bounds we provide here are for the asymptotic limit of in-
finite key lengths. Methods for security analysis of finite key length have been
developed by Hayashi [24] and Scarani and Renner [46] but they are beyond the
scope of this thesis.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 gives the definitions of a
quantum state and quantum measurement. Section 2.2 discusses the various types
of eavesdropping that an adversary can do depending on how much power she
has. We also discuss how her information can be bounded. In section 2.3, we
look at how Alice and Bob characterise the channel. This is to determine how
much information was leaked to the eavesdropper. In section 2.4, we calculate the
explicit values for the accessible information and Holevo quantity for two pure
input states with equal probability. Finally, section 2.5 gives a discussion on the
classical post-processing steps required in order to extract secret keys from the
raw data.
2.1 Quantum states and quantum measurements
Throughout this thesis, we shall deal with quantum states passing through a quan-
tum channel and being measured using quantum measurement devices. A quan-
tum state is a physical entity with a fixed physical property. We are usually in-
terested in only some degrees of freedom for the entity. Mathematically, the state
is represented by a positive semi-definite operator with unit trace in a complex
Hilbert space. The dimension of the Hilbert space corresponds to the degrees of
freedom that we are interested in.
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When we speak of a quantum channel, we refer to a fixed physical interaction
that brings one quantum state to another quantum state in the same Hilbert space.
The channel is memoryless; it acts on each quantum state independently. We can
think of the channel as an ensemble of identical channels, each of which is used
only once. Mathematically, a quantum channel can be represented by a completely
positive and trace preserving linear operator acting on the space of the quantum
states.
A quantum measurement device is a box with certain well defined physical
interactions and having a number of (possibly continuous) outcomes. Whenever a
physical state is put inside this box, the physical interactions are such that one of
its outcomes will click. This outcome presumably measures some physical prop-
erty of the quantum state. The box then resets to its initial state; ready to measure
the next incoming state. As far as this thesis is concerned, once a quantum state
has been measured, it is destroyed and not available for further measurements.
Mathematically, the outcomes of a measurement apparatus is associated with the
set of positive semi-definite operators Π = {pi j} j∈J . The outcomes are labelled
by j and J denotes the set of all possible outcomes. The outcomes sum up to the
identity on the Hilbert space of the quantum state on which the measurement is
performed. The set Π is called a positive operator value measure (POVM). For a
state ρ that is to be measured, the probability that it will trigger the j-th outcome







We assume that Eve is capable of doing perfect quantum operations and that she
has a perfect noiseless channel between both Alice and Bob. The noisy quantum
channel between Alice and Bob is replaced by Eve’s perfect channel. But Eve
sends Bob a state that was corrupted by her measurements such that Alice and
Bob still think that the channel is noisy.
Eve’s plan of attack would be to attach probes to the signals that Alice sends
to Bob. Eve lets these probes interact with the signal. But we restrict each probe
to interact with a different signal. After that, Eve waits until Alice and Bob have
concluded the protocol and even after they have utilised the key to transmit a
message. Only then will Eve measure her probes in such a way so that she gains
as much information as she can on the secret message. We assume that Eve can
store her probes indefinitely.
If we restrict Eve to measure each probe independently, this attack is called
an individual attack. The more general case where Eve can measure her probes
together is called a collective attack.
Depending on the probes Eve chooses, and how she measures those probes,
she may be able to get some information on the secret message. Our task is to
quantify how much information Eve can get. By knowing this information limit
on Eve, Alice and Bob can plan to use suitably strong privacy amplification tech-
niques to eliminate Eve’s information.
Fortunately, given the quantum state of Eve’s probes, we can bound Eve’s in-
formation in an individual as well as a collective attack. In an individual attack,
the amount of information Eve can attain by using a particular measurement strat-
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egy on her probes is given by the mutual information [49]. The maximum amount
of mutual information Eve can get (by using the best measurement strategy on her
probes) is called the accessible information.
The final key rate between Alice and Bob is given by the difference between
Alice and Bob’s mutual information and Eve’s accessible information (Csiszar
and Korner [16]).
For a collective attack, the amount of classical information Eve can extract
from her probes is bounded by Holevo’s bound [27]. This bound was shown to be
attainable by Holevo [28] and Schumacher and Westmoreland [48]. The final key
rate between Alice and Bob is given by the difference between Alice and Bob’s
mutual information and the Holevo quantity (Devetak and Winter [17]).
The most general class of attack is known as coherent attack (also called joint
attack). This is when Eve attaches one probe in a high dimensional Hilbert space
to all of Alice’s incoming signals. After Alice has sent her message, Eve then
measures her signal probe. However it was shown that for a finite dimensional
system, a coherent attack does not perform better than a collective attack (Renner
[43]). This result was later extended to an infinite dimensional system in [42].
2.3 Characterising the channel
In practice, the channel between Alice and Bob will not be perfect. There will
be some loss and noise due to interactions with the environment or perhaps to
the presence of an eavesdropper. To arrive at a bound on Eve’s knowledge of the
channel, we assume that all noise in the channel is due to Eve.
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For Alice and Bob to put an upper bound on the information Eve can get,
they would need to continuously characterise the channel. In most protocols,
the channel characterisation is done by using the actual signals and measurement
outcomes that will be used to generate the keys.
Protocols where Alice and Bob can fully characterise the channel are called to-
mographic protocols. The six-state protocol [10] and the Singapore protocol [19]
are examples of tomographic protocols. In these tomographic protocols, there is
a one-to-one correspondence between the noise that Alice and Bob see and the
probes that Eve uses.
In other protocols, there will not be enough information for complete char-
acterisation of the channel. These protocols are classified as incomplete tomo-
graphic protocols. This means that Eve can use several probing strategies, leaving
Bob with different quantum states, but Alice and Bob will not know which exact
strategy Eve used. The security analysis in such protocols are complicated by the
fact that Alice and Bob do not know what is the quantum state of Eve’s probe.
2.4 Eve’s information for two pure states
In this section, we summarise two useful results: the accessible information and
the Holevo quantity for two pure states with equal a priori probabilities. These
give the maximum amount of classical information that can be obtained by indi-
vidual measurements and collective measurements respectively.
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2.4.1 Accessible information for two pure states
Two pure states can always be mapped onto a two dimensional Hilbert space. We











































































Figure 2.1: Bloch sphere representation for the POVM that maximises the mu-
tual information for two pure input states with equal a priori probabilities. The
two pure input states ψ1 and ψ2 are represented by the red lines while the two
measurement outcomes φ1 and φ2 are shown in black.
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(1+ x) log(1+ x)+(1− x) log(1− x)
]
(2.9)
is a monotonically increasing function.
This is the maximum amount of information that can be obtained by individual
measurements on the input states.
2.4.2 Holevo quantity for two pure states





|ψ1〉〈ψ1|+ 12 |ψ2〉〈ψ2| (2.10)
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[(1+ sinα) log(1+ sinα)+(1− sinα) log(1− sinα)] (2.13)
= 1−Φ(sinα) (2.14)
= 1−Φ(∣∣〈ψ1∣∣ψ2〉∣∣) . (2.15)
This gives the maximum amount of information that can be obtained by col-
lective measurements on the input states.
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2.5 Classical post-processing
After having a bound on Eve’s information about the raw keys, Alice and Bob
would like to eliminate Eve’s information so that they can share an absolutely
secret key. This is done by doing some post-processing on the raw bits.
The raw bits are established via the quantum key distribution protocol. Alice
first generates a string of N′ random bits. She transmits this string to Bob through
a noisy channel. If the channel noise is unbiased, then the string as seen by Bob
will also be completely random. In other words, Bob’s string will still have an
entropy of N′ bits. Next Alice and Bob performs basis reconciliation depending
on the protocol. For example in the BB84 protocol, basis reconciliation would
involve Alice and Bob discarding data points from mismatch bases. After this
step, Alice and Bob would have a string of N bits.
The mutual information between Alice and Bob can be calculated after doing
a parameter estimation on the channel. We denote this by NIAB. Eve’s information
on Alice’s bits can also be estimated, and we denote her maximum information as
NIE . We assume that IAB is greater than IE . Otherwise the protocol fails and no
secret key can be generated. The post-processing begins after this point. The post-
processing can be divided into two parts, information reconciliation and privacy
amplification.
Information reconciliation involves Alice sending classical bits to Bob so that
Bob can correct his errors [9]. At the end of this process, Alice and Bob will
share a perfectly correlated random string of length N. Their mutual information
will be N bits. In a perfect reconciliation protocol, Alice will need to send just
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Mutual information Mutual information
between Alice and Bob between Eve and Alice
Raw key NIAB NIE
I.R. N N(1− IAB + IE)
P.A. N(IAB− IE) 0
Table 2.1: Table showing the mutual information between the Alice and Bob and
between Eve and Alice at the various stages of the post-processing procedure.
In the information reconciliation (I.R.) step, Alice announces N(1− IAB) bits of
information for Bob to correct his errors. In the privacy amplification (P.A.) step,
the length of the string is reduced by N(1− IAB + IE) bits so that the final mutual
information between Eve and Alice is zero.
N(1− IAB) classical bits to do the reconciliation. Listening to these bits, Eve’s
mutual information with Alice is now N (IE +1− IAB) bits.
The next step is privacy amplification [8]. In this step, Alice will choose a
random universal hashing function and apply that function on her string. As a
result, her string will reduce in length from N to
M = N−N (IE +1− IAB) (2.16)
= N(IAB− IE) . (2.17)
Bob will apply the same function to distill an identical string of length M. The
ratio of the new string to the old string is M/N = IAB− IE . Because Eve’s N bits
string differs from Alice’s, when Eve applies the hashing function, her resulting
M bits string will be completely uncorrelated to Alice’s string. Eve has zero in-
formation on Alice’s bits, while Alice and Bob share a string of M = N(IAB− IE)
secret bits. The mutual information between the Alice and Bob and between Alice





Security analysis of a quantum
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Introduction to the protocol
The first protocol that we shall investigate is a discrete variable direct communica-
tion protocol. This direct communication protocol enables Alice to send messages
to Bob without the need to first establish a shared secret key.
In section 3.1, we will give the origins of the protocol that we want to study.
We also recap some preliminary work that was done to analyse the security of the
protocol. In section 3.2, we shall formally introduce the protocol with an example
to demonstrate its workings. In section 3.3, a possible experimental setup for
of the protocol will be presented. Finally section 3.4 gives a discussion on the
direct communication protocol. It also provides a comparison between a direct
communication protocol and a key distribution protocol.
3.1 Introduction
The protocol that we shall study uses two-qubit states for transmitting a classical
bit. The idea of using two qubits to deterministically send a classical bit was pub-
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lished by Beige, Englert, Kurtsiefer and Weinfurter in a book chapter in 2002 [3].
The protocol can also be found in [5] with slight generalisations.
Deterministic here means that for every two-qubit state that Alice sends, Bob
will get one bit of key. Both publications briefly mention a two-qubit protocol in
which Alice can transmit the message securely without having to first establish a
key. This direct communication protocol was published as a separate publication
on its own in [4].
In all those publications, the security analysis was restricted to minimising
the error rate in a general intercept and resend attack. The intercept and resend
strategy was not required to be unbiased.
In [4], the intercept resend attack where Eve measures Alice’s qubit using an
orthogonal measurement basis and then forwards the outcome state to Bob was
analysed. It was found that for any orthogonal measurement used, the error rate
Alice and Bob see will be at least 1/6. Furthermore, numerical simulations in
which Eve forwards a different state from her outcome state were done but the
error rate was still never less than 1/6.
3.2 The protocol
The protocol involves states of two qubits. The next paragraph will introduce the
states.
Let {|1−〉 , |2−〉 , |3−〉 , |4−〉} be a set of orthonormal states that forms a basis
in Alice’s four dimensional Hilbert space. We call these states the minus sta-
tes. We define a second set of orthonormal states which we call the plus states,
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For example the state
|2+〉= 1√
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if n 6= m . (3.4)
These eight states {|n+〉 , |n−〉} for n∈ 1,2,3,4 are the ingredients of the protocol.
In the first step of the protocol, Alice will send to Bob one of the eight states
{|n+〉 , |n−〉}. The parity type (+ or −) of the state Alice sends will correspond
to the bit of the message that she intends to convey. The numeral type (1, 2, 3 or
4) is chosen at random.
When Bob receives Alice’s two-qubit state, he picks one of two measurement
boxes to measure the two-qubit state. Each box has four outcomes. The first
box, we call the plus box, has outcomes such that the state |n+〉 will cause the
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Alice’s numeral type Bob uses plus box Bob uses minus box1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 + − − − − + + +
2 − + − − + − + +
3 − − + − + + − +
4 − − − + + + + −
Table 3.1: Table that Bob uses to determine the parity of Alice’s bit based on
Alice’s numeral type and the parity type of Bob’s measuring box. For example, if
Alice sends a type 2, and Bob measured the state using the plus box and obtains
outcome 3, Bob concludes that Alice had send a minus parity.
n-th outcome to click. Bob can construct the plus box since the plus states are
mutually orthogonal. Analogously, the minus box distinguishes the minus states.
Bob chooses his measurement box at random.
In the final stage of the protocol, after Bob has done his measurement, Alice
reveals the numeral type of the state that she sends. Bob will then know what is
the bit type by looking up the table 3.1.
3.2.1 Example of the protocol
The protocol is perhaps easiest understood through an example. As an example,
say that Alice wants to send Bob the ten bits string
{−,−,−,+,−,−,+,−,+,−} .
She generates a string of ten random numbers from one to four
{2,1,1,2,4,2,3,1,4,4} .
33
She pairs each bit to a random number and sends the state corresponding to the
pairing. In our example, Alice sends the states
{|2−〉 , |1−〉 , |1−〉 , |2+〉 , |4−〉 , |2−〉 , |3+〉 , |1−〉 , |4+〉 , |4−〉} .
Bob will generate a string of ten random bits to use to decide which box (plus
or minus) to use to measure the incoming qubit pairs. Bob generates the random
string
{+,−,+,−,−,+,+,+,+,−} .
In the first qubit pair, Alice sends a minus state |2−〉 and Bob measures using the
plus box. Due to the relation
〈
2+
∣∣2−〉= 0, Bob will never get the outcome 2. In
fact he would get the outcomes 1, 3 or 4 with equal probability. In this case, let us
say outcome 3 happens to click.
In the second qubit pair, Alice sends the minus state |1−〉 and Bob measures
using the minus box. In this case, Bob will get outcome 1 for certain. The out-
comes for Bob are given in following table.
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Alice Bob’s measurement Bob’s Bob’s
send box outcome decoded bit
|2−〉 + 3 −
|1−〉 − 1 −
|1−〉 + 2 −
|2+〉 − 1 +
|4−〉 − 4 −
|2−〉 + 4 −
|3+〉 + 3 +
|1−〉 + 2 −
|4+〉 + 4 +
|4−〉 − 4 −
When Alice sends the same parity type as Bob’s measurement box, Bob’s outcome
would be the same as Alice’s numeral state (as in cases 2, 5, 7, 9 and 10). If Alice’s
parity differs from the parity of Bob’s measurement box, then Bob’s outcome will
not be the same as Alice’s numeral state.
For the first qubit pair, after Alice announces that she sends a type 2 state, Bob
can find out from table 3.1 that Alice sends the minus bit. Bob can also decode all
the remaining incoming qubit pairs correctly to unravel Alice’s message.
3.3 Experimental setup
To our knowledge, no experiments were conducted with regards to this protocol.
In this section, we outline a possible realisation of the protocol’s two separate
degrees of freedoms using a photon. We use the polarisation of the photon as one













Figure 3.1: An experimental setup for converting the plus states to the minus
states. It consists of an interferometer with two sets of polarisers VR and VL to
convert the plus states to the minus states. The polarisers VR and VL consist of a
half waveplate sandwiched between two quarter waveplates. The angle settings
for the waveplates are stated in the text. The polarisers V1 and V2 are set to do
nothing. BS denotes beam splitter.
The labels v and h denote vertical and horizontal polarisations while the labels L
and R denote the upper and lower arms of the interferometer respectively.
In [20], it was shown that an arbitrary two-qubit operation can be realised by a
combination of wave plates and phase shifter. In particular, the setup in figure 3.1
can realise any two-qubit gate by suitable choices of phase shifters and wave plate
V1, V2, VL and VR. Each of these V consists of a half wave plate sandwiched
between a quarter wave plate plus a phase shifter. The unitary action of the beam
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)
(3.5)













1− iσ1 sin(2θ)− iσ3 cos(2θ)
)
(3.7)









σ1 = |h〉〈v|+ |v〉〈h| (3.9)
and
σ3 = |v〉〈v|− |h〉〈h| . (3.10)
The complete V is made up of







If we define the plus basis as
{|1+〉 , |2+〉 , |3+〉 , |4+〉}= {|Lv〉 , |Lh〉 , |Rv〉 , |Rh〉} , (3.12)
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then the choice
V1 = 1 , (3.13)
V2 = 1 , (3.14)
VL = V (α,βL,γ,φ) , (3.15)
VR = V (α,βR,γ,φ) (3.16)
would convert the plus basis into the minus basis where the angles are












α =−3pi8 , (3.19)













|v〉〈v|(−i)+ |v〉〈h|(1− i)+ |h〉〈v|(−1− i)+ |h〉〈h|(i)
]
(3.22)
and with the combined action of the wave plates as

















Figure 3.2: Experimental setup for the two-qubit direct communication protocol.
Alice uses a half wave plate (HWP) to send either horizontal or vertical polarised
light. The switch (SW) is used to select either the upper or lower arm of the
interferometer. When her set of flipper mirrors (FM1) is activated, the light will
be reflected off the mirrors (M) and bypass the conversion box (Utot). This will
send a state with positive parity to Bob. Deactivating the flipper mirrors will
cause the light to go through the conversion box which brings a positive parity
state to a negative parity state. This will send a state with negative parity to Bob.
When Bob activates his set of flipper mirrors (FM2), the light only goes through
a polarising beam splitter (PBS) before being detected at the detectors (D1–D4).
This will act to distinguish the plus parity states. To implement the negative parity
measurement, Bob deactivates his flipper mirrors causing the light to pass first
through the reverse conversion box (U†tot) before the detection.
the setup in figure 3.1 is described by the unitary
Utot = UBSVWPUMUBS (3.24)
= |1−〉〈1+|+ |2−〉〈2+|+ |3−〉〈3+|+ |4−〉〈4+| (3.25)
which converts the plus basis to the minus basis as promised. We call this setup
the conversion box. It turns out that the conversion box will convert the minus
states to the plus states.
The final setup between Alice and Bob is depicted in figure 3.2. Alice always
starts by creating one of the four plus states. To send a minus state, Alice will put
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her plus state through the conversion box Utot. This two-qubit state is then sent to
Bob via the quantum channel. At Bob’s laboratory, he has a set of four detectors
used to perform a measurement in the plus basis. To measure in the minus basis,
Bob will pass the two-qubit state through a conversion box operated in reverse
U†tot before measuring them.
3.4 Discussions on direct communication
In this section, we discuss the distinctive features of a direct communication proto-
col. We will then point out the main differences between a direct communication
and a key distribution protocol.
The novel feature of a direct communication protocol is that the message itself
is being transmitted through the quantum channel. To ensure secrecy of the mes-
sage, the message must remain undecipherable until the channel security during
transmission has been checked. This is a unique situation where a secret message
has to go through a channel whose security can only be checked after its use. To
ensure the message remains undecipherable two different sets of basis are used in
this protocol. The basis announcements that enable the decoding of the message
are only released after the channel security has been established.
For direct communication to take place, Bob must be able to decode each bit
deterministically. For him to do this without having a quantum storage device, the
protocol uses a two-qubit state to transmit a single bit.
To date, most quantum communication implementations have favoured key
distribution rather than direct communication. There are several practical reasons
for the former’s popularity.
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One reason is that a key distribution protocol is less affected by losses than a
direct communication protocol. In a key distribution protocol, a lost signal merely
means that Alice and Bob have to transmit more signals to generate sufficient raw
bits. Since the lost signals do not contain any message yet, they do not compro-
mise security. A direct communication protocol however is not as robust against
loss. Loss translates to missing bits in the message and hence noise in the trans-
mitted message.
Another advantage of key distribution over direct communication is that once
generated, the secret keys can be accumulated and stored for future use. The
quantum channel can be consistently utilised to establish a reserve of keys. In a
direct communication protocol, the message can only be transmitted when Alice
has something to communicate to Bob. The channel will be utilised during these
periods. However there will be lull periods when Alice does not have anything to
say to Bob where the quantum channel would stay idle. Hence we can foresee that
the capacity of the quantum channel would be better utilised in a key distribution
protocol rather than a direct communication protocol.
In a key distribution protocol, secret two way communication between Alice
and Bob is possible once the secret keys have been established. However in a
direct communication protocol, to achieve the same thing, a two way quantum
channel would be needed.
A major flaw of a direct communication protocol is that since the message
is being transmitted, then in the presence of noise, the eavesdropper can gain
information on the message itself. For example, Eve could use the same procedure
that Bob uses to decode the two-qubit states that she intercepts. Doing this, the
message is no longer secret. Eve would gain partial knowledge of the message.
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It is possible for Alice to perform a ‘privacy amplification’ procedure prior to
using the channel. This would result in Alice and Bob sharing a completely secret
message but at the expense that the message will be completely random. This
procedure is discussed briefly in chapter 10.
For these reasons, we do not expect a direct communication protocol to be
favoured over a key distribution protocol in the near future. For the situation to
change, we would need to have a quantum channel with a high transmission rate.
We would also need to develop the ability to easily manipulate two-qubit states.
And at a more fundamental level, we would need to find a way such that Bob can
deterministically decode Alice’s message but not Eve.
Even if we concede that performing direct communication is not feasible, the
protocol can still be used as a key distribution protocol. The results in this thesis




Noise 1: Intercept and resend
strategies
In this chapter, we shall look at a particular class of intercept and resend attacks.
This class involves Eve measuring Alice’s two-qubit states using the plus or minus
measurement box with equal probability. Eve then forwards a plus or minus state
with certain probabilities depending on the outcomes of her measurements.
In general, Eve could use a different set of POVM to measure Alice’s two-
qubit state. But in this chapter, we let her measure only the plus or minus POVM.
If Eve measures this on all of Alice’s two-qubit states, she will be able to gain full
information on Alice’s message after Alice announces her numeral type.
Section 4.1 gives some intuition on how the presence of an eavesdropper in the
channel can be noticed. In section 4.2, we present a simple eavesdropping strategy
for Eve that happens to be biased. Finally, section 4.3 introduces the concept of
unbiased noise and gives an example of an unbiased eavesdropping strategy.
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State Alice sends Outcome of Bob’s measurement〈1+| 〈2+| 〈3+| 〈4+| 〈1−| 〈2−| 〈3−| 〈4−|
|1+〉 116 0 0 0 0 148 148 148
|2+〉 0 116 0 0 148 0 148 148
|3+〉 0 0 116 0 148 148 0 148
|4+〉 0 0 0 116 148 148 148 0
|1−〉 0 148 148 148 116 0 0 0
|2−〉 148 0 148 148 0 116 0 0
|3−〉 148 148 0 148 0 0 116 0
|4−〉 148 148 148 0 0 0 0 116
Table 4.1: Joint probability table for the raw data between Alice and Bob for the
direct communication protocol in a noiseless channel.
4.1 Introduction
The security of the protocol hinges on the fact that if an eavesdropper tries to learn
about the message that Alice sends, she will leave behind some traces that Alice
and Bob can detect.
Alice puts some control bits in her message string. These bits are randomly
chosen and randomly interspersed between the message. They will be used to
check the integrity of the channel. Alice will announce the positions of the control
bits. For each control bit, Bob then tells Alice the measurement box he used as
well as its outcome. If the channel is perfectly noiseless, then Alice and Bob
would expect to get a joint probability that looks like table 4.1. If Alice and
Bob obtains anything different, that would indicate the possible presence of an
eavesdropper in the channel.
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4.2 A simple but biased intercept and resend attack
Let us look at a particular strategy for the eavesdropper Eve. Suppose she does an
intercept and resend attack. Eve intercepts all the incoming qubits and measures
each of them using her own plus or minus box. She then forwards the resulting
states to Bob. If Eve was lucky and her chosen basis happens to match the parity
type that Alice encoded, then Eve would not be detected. However if Eve were
to measure in the opposite basis, then Bob might get a measurement outcome that
he should otherwise never get.
For example if Alice sends the state |1+〉 as a control bit. When Eve measures
the qubit pair using the plus basis (she does this half of the time) she will get
the outcome |1+〉. She forwards this to Bob and in this case Alice and Bob do
not suspect that anything is amiss. However when Eve measures using the minus
basis (which she does with probability half), she gets one of the three possible
outcomes: {|2−〉 , |3−〉 , |4−〉}, each with equal probability. When she forwards
any of this state to Bob, there is a chance that if Bob were to measure using the
plus basis, his 2, 3 or 4 outcomes would trigger. These outcomes are impossible
in the secure channel. Hence Alice and Bob suspect that their channel has been
compromised.
The probability matters are summarised in the following table. It gives the
probabilities of Bob’s outcomes for each of Eve’s possible outcomes.
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State Eve Outcome of Bob’s measurement Eve’s
forwards 〈1+| 〈2+| 〈3+| 〈4+| 〈1−| 〈2−| 〈3−| 〈4−| M.P.
|1+〉 14 0 0 0 0 112 112 112 12
|2−〉 136 0 136 136 0 112 0 0 16
|3−〉 136 136 0 136 0 0 112 0 16























The abbreviations M.P. and E.P. stand for marginal probabilities and expected
probabilities. We see that Bob gets the states |2+〉, |3+〉 and |4+〉 each with a
probability of 1/18. In the secure channel, these states are never expected.
Repeating this for all the other states that Alice sends, we get the joint proba-
bility table between Alice and Bob as given by the following table.
State Alice sends
Outcome of Bob’s measurement
〈1+| 〈2+| 〈3+| 〈4+| 〈1−| 〈2−| 〈3−| 〈4−|
|1+〉 124 1144 1144 1144 0 148 148 148
|2+〉 1144 124 1144 1144 148 0 148 148
|3+〉 1144 1144 124 1144 148 148 0 148
|4+〉 1144 1144 1144 124 148 148 148 0
|1−〉 0 148 148 148 124 1144 1144 1144
|2−〉 148 0 148 148 1144 124 1144 1144
|3−〉 148 148 0 148 1144 1144 124 1144
|4−〉 148 148 148 0 1144 1144 1144 124
This joint probability table is biased in the sense that the mismatched basis results
are free of noise but the matching basis results suffer from noise.
Eve will get be able to decode with full certainty Alice’s bits once Alice an-
nounces her numeral type. Summing up the entries of the joint probability table,
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The error rate corresponding to this attack is Q = 1/6.
We do not allow Eve to do any attacks that result in biased joint probability
outcomes. The next section will define more precisely what we mean by unbiased
attacks which result in unbiased noise as seen by Alice and Bob.
4.3 Unbiased noise
In an ideal world, Alice and Bob would have a perfect noiseless channel. They
would abort the protocol whenever they find that their channel is contaminated.
However living in a universe that is not so ideal, Alice and Bob compromise by
allowing some noise in the channel. Still they insist that the noise is unbiased.
By this, we mean that all the entries of Alice and Bob’s joint probability table are
modified in the same way. The new noisy probabilities are related to the noiseless
probabilities by
pnew = (1− ε)pold + ε 164 , (4.1)
where 0≤ ε≤ 1 quantifies the amount of noise in the channel. With this unbiased
noise the new joint probability table between Alice and Bob is given by table 4.2.
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State Alice sends Outcome of Bob’s measurement〈1+| 〈2+| 〈3+| 〈4+| 〈1−| 〈2−| 〈3−| 〈4−|
|1+〉 4−3ε64 ε64 ε64 ε64 ε64 4−ε192 4−ε192 4−ε192
|2+〉 ε64 4−3ε64 ε64 ε64 4−ε192 ε64 4−ε192 4−ε192
|3+〉 ε64 ε64 4−3ε64 ε64 4−ε192 4−ε192 ε64 4−ε192
|4+〉 ε64 ε64 ε64 4−3ε64 4−ε192 4−ε192 4−ε192 ε64
|1−〉 ε64 4−ε192 4−ε192 4−ε192 4−3ε64 ε64 ε64 ε64
|2−〉 4−ε192 ε64 4−ε192 4−ε192 ε64 4−3ε64 ε64 ε64
|3−〉 4−ε192 4−ε192 ε64 4−ε192 ε64 ε64 4−3ε64 ε64
|4−〉 4−ε192 4−ε192 4−ε192 ε64 ε64 ε64 ε64 4−3ε64
Table 4.2: Joint probability table for the raw data between Alice and Bob for the
direct communication protocol in a channel with unbiased noise ε.
The intercept and resend attack strategy in section 4.2 clearly does not mimic
an unbiased noise channel. In fact for that attack, the joint probability table be-
tween Alice and Bob shows no noise in the event where Alice’s state parity does
not match Bob’s measurement parity. However when their parities match, they
see a noise value corresponding to ε = 4/9.
After Alice and Bob find out their actual joint probability table for the strategy
in section 4.2, they can make their joint probability table unbiased by adding some
controlled noise on their raw keys. This will reduce their correlations, but it will
allow Alice and Bob to obtain an upper bound on Eve’s information based only on
unbiased attacks. For this particular attack, the strategy involves Bob randomly
flipping 1/4 of his outcomes to the opposite parity type.
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When Bob does this, the new unbiased probabilities p˜ are related to the old





















































Comparing with the unbiased probability table 4.2, we can check that this corre-
sponds to a noise level of ε = 2/3.
This flipping of parity does not change Eve’s input states when she attacks
Alice. It also does not reveal any additional information to Eve. If Alice and Bob
introduce controlled noise to remove any bias in their joint probabilities, then Eve
will not have any advantage in doing a biased attack. She loses the opportunity to
add her own noise into the channel by doing a biased attack. Hence for the same
unbiased error rate, there is an unbiased strategy that is at least as good as a biased
strategy. In the next section, we shall give an unbiased intercept and resend attack
that has a noise level of ε = 2/3.
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4.3.1 Unbiased attack with noise level of ε = 2/3
To mimic an unbiased noise, let us consider a different intercept and resend strat-
egy for Eve. She needs to introduce some artificial noise such that Alice and Bob
see something unbiased.
Consider this strategy for Eve. Once again Eve measures the incoming two-
qubit state using either the plus or minus box. But she sends whatever state she
measures with a probability of only 3/4. She sends the states with the opposite
parity with probability 1/4. We shall see that this attack results in unbiased noise
between Alice and Bob.
For example, say Alice sends the state |1+〉. Again, Eve will get the state |1+〉
with probability 1/2 or the states {|2−〉 , |3−〉 , |4−〉}, each with probability 1/6.
When Eve gets the state |1+〉, she will send out |1+〉 with probability 3/4 and the
opposite parity state |1−〉 with probability 1/4. She does the same if she gets the
minus states.
The following table summarises the total probabilities for Eve to send out each
state when Alice sends the state |1+〉.
Eve’s Eve’s forwarded state Eve’s
outcome |1+〉 |2+〉 |3+〉 |4+〉 |1−〉 |2−〉 |3−〉 |4−〉 M.P.
|1+〉 38 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 12
|2−〉 0 124 0 0 0 18 0 0 16
|3−〉 0 0 124 0 0 0 18 0 16


















The last entry of the table gives the state that Bob will receive from Eve, given
that Alice sends the state |1+〉. When Bob performs his measurements, he will
get the outcomes as given in the next table.
State Eve Outcome of Bob’s measurement Eve’s
forwards 〈1+| 〈2+| 〈3+| 〈4+| 〈1−| 〈2−| 〈3−| 〈4−| M.P.
|1+〉 316 0 0 0 0 116 116 116 38
|2+〉 0 148 0 0 1144 0 1144 1144 124
|3+〉 0 0 148 0 1144 1144 0 1144 124
|4+〉 0 0 0 148 1144 1144 1144 0 124
|1−〉 0 148 148 148 116 0 0 0 18
|2−〉 148 0 148 148 0 116 0 0 18
|3−〉 148 148 0 148 0 0 116 0 18

















The last entry in the table gives the actual outcomes of Bob’s detectors when
Alice sends the state |1+〉. Comparing with Alice and Bob’s joint probability
table with unbiased noise when Alice sends |1+〉, Alice and Bob would not be
able to differentiate between Eve’s presence and a channel with unbiased noise at
ε = 2/3.
Of course, Bob will get similar unbiased marginal probabilities when Alice
sends other states as well.
We note that since the channel between Alice and Eve was perfect, by doing
this intercept and resend attack, Eve knows everything about the bits that Alice
sends. So we can conclude that when Alice and Bob see an unbiased noise level
of ε = 2/3, Eve already has full information about Alice’s bits.
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4.3.2 A slightly more general unbiased attack with noise level
of ε≥ 2/3
In fact the intercept and resend strategy that we just presented is just one of many
intercept and resend strategies that Eve can use but that still mimics an unbiased
noise. Here we present a slightly more general strategy.
The strategy is as follows. When Eve measures the outcome 1 in the plus box,
she forwards to Bob the states in the following table with the shown probabilities.









Putting this into words, she forwards the state she receives with probability p0, the
states having a different numeral but the same parity with probability p1, the state
with the same numeral but a different parity with probability p2 and the states
having a different numeral and a different parity with probability p3.
Using this strategy, given that Alice sends the state |1+〉, the probabilities
of Bob obtaining a particular outcome after summing over all of Eve’s possible
outcomes are given in the following table.
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Bob’s outcome Probability
〈1+| 16(2p0 + p1 +3p3)
〈2+| 118(p0 +8p1 +3p2 +6p3)
〈3+| 118(p0 +8p1 +3p2 +6p3)
〈4+| 118(p0 +8p1 +3p2 +6p3)
〈1−| 16(3p1 + p2 + p3)
〈2−| 118(3p0 +6p1 + p2 +8p3)
〈3−| 118(3p0 +6p1 + p2 +8p3)
〈4−| 118(3p0 +6p1 + p2 +8p3)
For the noise to be consistent with the unbiased noise, Eve needs to choose her
probabilities p0, p1, p2 and p3 such that Bob’s outcomes match the entries of
the unbiased joint probability table 4.2. This gives four equations for the four
probabilities:
1
















These four equations are not all independent. They can be reduced to the following
three equations








p2− p3 = 3−3ε4 ,
(4.12)
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where we have one free parameter remaining. The least value of ε consistent with
this unbiased intercept resend strategy can be obtained from the second equation.
Because probabilities have to be positive,




=⇒ ε≥ 23 . (4.14)
The unique choice of p0 = 3/4, p1 = 0, p2 = 1/4 and p3 = 0 corresponds to our
earlier unbiased intercept resend strategy for ε = 2/3. For ε > 2/3, there is more
than one eavesdropping strategy for Eve in this class.
4.4 Alice and Bob’s mutual information for unbi-
ased noise
For an unbiased attack, we can find the mutual information between Alice and
Bob in terms of the noise parameter. Summing up the entries in table 4.2, the















We note that for the unbiased channel, the error rate Q equals to ε/2.
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Chapter 5
Noise 2: General eavesdropping
strategies
The intercept and resend strategy that we presented in the last chapter is just one
class of attacks that Eve can perform. The more general thing for her to do would
be to entangle some ancilla states to Alice’s qubit pairs via a unitary evolution.
Eve keeps her ancillas and sends Alice’s sub-system to Bob. To extract the most
information out of her ancillas, Eve will only measure her ancillas once Alice and
Bob have finished the whole protocol and used the resulting keys.
Eve’s entangling scheme is constrained by the probabilities that Alice and Bob
check in table 4.1. The security analysis boils down to finding the best entangling
scheme for Eve (subject to the probability constraints) for a given noise level ε.
In this chapter, we shall recast the problem in a different setting. We look at an
equivalent protocol so that the security analysis becomes slightly neater. Instead
of Alice sending qubit pairs to Bob, we will consider the modified protocol where
Eve sends Alice a qubit pair and she sends Bob another qubit pair. Where Alice
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prepares a state to send to Bob in the original protocol, in this setting Alice will do
a measurement on the state that Eve sends. Her measurement will collapse Bob’s
state to the state that Alice intends Bob to receive.
Section 5.1 presents the protocol in its original setting where Alice sends a
pure state to Bob through a noisy channel. Section 5.2 looks at the equivalent
protocol where Eve controls the source. Finally, section 5.3 introduces the eaves-
dropper and the records that she has access to when Alice and Bob see noise in
their channel.
5.1 Alice–Bob channel
In the original protocol, there is a quantum channel between Alice and Bob. When
Alice sends a pure state to Bob, by the time the state gets to Bob, this channel
would have turned it to something else (unless the channel is perfectly isolated).
There are several equivalent ways to parametrise the channel. We can regard
a channel E as a unitary transformation UBE being done on the input state ρA and
an ancillary state |0〉E . The output state ρB is obtained by tracing out the ancillary
subsystem at the end of the unitary evolution





where E(ρ) denotes the action of the channel on a state ρ. The maximum dimen-
sion of the ancillary state |0〉 needed to specify an arbitrary channel is d2, where
d is the dimension of Hilbert space of the input states (see for example [39]).
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The channel can also be described by a pure state in d4 dimensions between
Alice–Bob and Eve. When Alice obtains a POVM outcome corresponding to an
arbitrary state ρA that she sends, the resulting state at Bob’s end would be the
outcome of the channel ρB = S (ρA). In appendix A, we provide an explicit con-
struction for the pure state between Alice–Bob and Eve for an arbitrary channel
between Alice and Bob.
5.2 Alice measures protocol
We now introduce the equivalent protocol where Alice and Bob share an entangled
state emitting from a source. Alice will measure her state using a POVM and the
state Bob receives at this end will depend on the outcome of Alice’s measurement.
In this scheme, we consider a source which emits two qubit-pairs, the first pair
to Alice and the second to Bob. The qubit pair is in the state




where the notation |a,b〉 means |a〉 |b〉. The state |a〉 goes to Alice and the state
|b〉 goes to Bob. We choose this state as the source because we must have the
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The third equality follows because um,n is real.
In this setting, Alice also has two measuring apparatus, the plus box and the
minus box. To prepare a plus state, Alice puts the qubit-pair she receives into her
plus box. If she gets the n-th outcome she would collapse Bob’s qubit pair to the
|n+〉 state. In the original protocol, Alice randomly chooses a numeral type, but
now this random selection is made by her measuring box. To prepare a minus
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state, Alice would measure her qubit pair using the minus box. From this point
onwards, the protocol remains the same as the original one.
5.3 When there is noise
If Alice and Bob get the source state in the state |Ψ〉AB, then they will obtain a
joint probability table like table 4.1. We shall see in section 8.1 that with this
pure state, Alice and Bob can be certain that their communication is completely
private. An eavesdropper would not be able to gain any information about their
communication. That is if Alice and Bob see a probability table like table 4.1,
they can be sure that the source state was the pure state |Ψ〉AB.
But when noise is present, the probability table that Alice and Bob get will
no longer be the perfect table. Alice and Bob insist on the noise being unbiased
and not too large. They only continue with the protocol if they have a joint prob-
ability table like table 4.2 and the noise level ε is less than a certain threshold ε0.
Otherwise they conclude that someone is eavesdropping and abort the protocol,
they refuse to communicate. This threshold will be the maximum amount of noise
that Alice and Bob can protect themselves against (by using error correcting codes
and privacy amplification techniques) and yet still maintain a completely private
communication.
On insisting for an unbiased noise, Alice and Bob hope to get a source state




a mixture of the perfect source state with an unbiased noise state. But with only
the joint probability table accessible to them, they cannot be sure. For any non
zero amount of noise, there will be many different states that will give rise to
the same joint probability table for Alice and Bob. Thus Alice and Bob must be
content with the following 64 restrictions on the source state they actually get:
Tr{ρAB |a+,b+〉〈a+,b+|}= 1− ε4 δa,b +
ε
16 , (5.11)
Tr{ρAB |a−,b−〉〈a−,b−|}= 1− ε4 δa,b +
ε
16 , (5.12)
Tr{ρAB |a+,b−〉〈a+,b−|}= 1− ε12 (1−δa,b)+
ε
16 , (5.13)
Tr{ρAB |a−,b+〉〈a−,b+|}= 1− ε12 (1−δa,b)+
ε
16 (5.14)
for {a,b} ∈ {1,2,3,4}, where ρAB is the state from the source.
5.3.1 The eavesdropper
When Alice and Bob see noise in their communication, they attribute that noise to
a malicious eavesdropper Eve that controls their source. They want to know how
much information Eve can learn so that they can protect the communication by
building in redundancies in the message. If Alice and Bob receive the state ρAB
from the source we can always assume that this (possibly mixed) state is part of a
higher dimensional pure state |Ψ〉ABE , where tracing over Eve’s subsystem gives
Alice and Bob’s state ρAB,
ρAB = TrE {|Ψ〉ABE 〈Ψ|ABE} . (5.15)
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In this language, for every state that the source provides Alice and Bob, Eve has a
record in the from of
ρE = TrAB {|Ψ〉ABE 〈Ψ|ABE} . (5.16)
Eve will keep all her records, until Alice and Bob have performed all their mea-
surements and Alice has revealed her numeral types. At this point the communica-
tion is over and Bob knows the message that Alice wanted to communicate to him.
Now Eve is ready to extract some information about the message by performing a
collective measurement on all her records.
Suppose Alice announces that her measurement outcome was a type 1. Eve’s
input state would depend on whether it was a type 1+ or 1−. If Alice’s outcome
was 1+, Eve’s record state becomes ρEA=1+ and if Alice’s outcome was 1−, Eve’s
record collapses to ρEA=1−, where
ρEA=1+ = 4TrAB {(|1+〉〈1+|⊗1B) |Ψ〉ABE 〈Ψ|ABE} , (5.17)
ρEA=1− = 4TrAB {(|1−〉〈1−|⊗1B) |Ψ〉ABE 〈Ψ|ABE} . (5.18)
The two states are normalised so that the trace of both ρEA=1+ and ρEA=1− are equal
to one. On average, the message Alice sends has the same number of plus and
minus bits. The probability of Eve to get either state is 1/2.
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The maximum amount of information that Eve can learn from the type 1 states
































The total information Eve learns about the message is then the average of the














Eve could also choose to learn about Bob’s measurement outcomes instead of
Alice’s. In this case, she will get an analogous quantity IEB . Our task is to find out
what is the maximum value that the quantity IEA (or IEB ) can attain for a given noise
ε. We want to maximise IEA (or IEB ) over all possible purifications |Ψ〉ABE subject
to the 64 conditions (5.11)–(5.14).
5.3.2 Eve’s purification











where |ea〉 and |eb〉 are some arbitrary orthonormal basis for Alice and Bob. The
16 kets |Eab〉 are Eve’s records which is the purification of Alice and Bob’s state.
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The choice of this purification determines the information Eve will get. The re-
maining task would be to find the optimal purification that would give Eve the
maximum information.
In writing the purified state |Ψ〉ABE , the choice of basis for Alice and Bob is








|φn,m〉 |Fn,m〉 , (5.23)
where |φn,m〉 is some (possibly entangled) orthonormal basis for Alice and Bob.


























Comparing this with equation (5.22) we see that the |Fab〉 kets are related to the













5.3.3 Eve’s input states
From equations (5.17) and (5.18), we can write Eve’s reduced states when Alice
announces that she obtained an outcome of type 1. For the 1+ outcome, we have































while for the 1− outcome, we have































Each state is written as the sum of four projectors and would have a maximum of
rank four. The total state ρEA=1 = 12ρEA=1+ +
1
2ρEA=1− can at most have rank eight.
We can also find Eve’s reduced states conditioned on the outcome of Bob’s
measurement. For completeness, we shall write down those states here. For exam-
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ple, if Bob’s outcome happens to be of type 2+, then Eve’s record state becomes



















If Bob announces the numeral type of her outcome, then Eve would try and dis-
tinguish if her record state is in the state ρEB=2+ or ρEB=2−. But since Bob does
not reveal his numeral type, for Eve to guess Bob’s parity, she has to distinguish


















































































where the state for example ρEA=1−
B=3+
is Eve’s reduced state when Alice obtains




TrAB {(|1−〉〈−1|⊗ |3+〉〈3+|) |Ψ〉ABE 〈Ψ|ABE}
Tr{(|1−〉〈−1|⊗ |3+〉〈3+|) |Ψ〉ABE 〈Ψ|ABE}
. (5.37)
However, in this thesis, we shall only be concerned with Eve trying to distinguish
Alice’s states. Eve’s reduced states conditioned on the outcome of Bob’s measure-
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ment would only be relevant if Alice and Bob were to do a reverse reconciliation




In this chapter, we formalise the problem of optimising Eve’s information in a
matrix formulation. There are two sections. In the section 6.1, we write down the
constraints on the reduced state between Alice and Bob. In section 6.2, we find
how these constraints set a restriction on Eve’s reduced state.
6.1 The constraints





|ABI〉 |EI〉 , (6.1)
where the kets |ABI〉 are 16 arbitrary (but not necessarily separable) orthonormal
basis for Alice and Bob. Eve’s records |EI〉 are not necessarily normalised or
orthogonal.
68
The 64 constraints are
TrAB {(Pa±⊗Qb±)ρAB}= p(a±,b±) (6.2)
for all four combinations of pluses and minuses and for {a,b} ∈ {1,2,3,4}. The
state ρAB = TrE {|Ψ〉ABE 〈Ψ|ABE} is Alice and Bob’s reduced state and Pa± and














(Qb+ +Qb−) = 1B . (6.6)
The right hand side of equation (6.2) are the probabilities for Alice and Bob to get
the outcome a±,b± as given in table 4.2. The sum of the 16 probabilities in each



















and the sum of all 64 probabilities adds up to one.
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6.2 Eve’s records
Eve’s statistical operator would be






Conditioned on Alice and Bob getting the outcome of a± and b± Eve’s reduced
state would be















































































So if we have all the inner products
〈
EJ
∣∣EJ′〉, we can take the (arbitrary) square
root to get 〈FJ|X |FJ′〉 =
〈
FJ
∣∣EJ′〉 which gives us a column representation for the
vectors |EJ′〉 in the orthonormal |FJ〉 basis. The choice of the square root X fixes
the orthonormal basis |FJ〉. Putting this back into Eve’s record state in equa-
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〈FJ|X |FI〉〈ABI|P†a±⊗Q†b± |ABI′〉∗ 〈FI′|X† |FJ′〉 . (6.24)
Eve’s measurement strategy depends on the type Alice announces. Eve’s two

















The constraints on Eve’s records are













〈FK|X |FI〉〈ABI|P†a±⊗Q†b± |ABI′〉∗ 〈FI′|X† |FK〉 (6.29)
Eve’s optimisation problem would be to find X (once she has chosen a basis |F〉)
which maximises IEA , the information Eve can learn, subject to the constraints
above. After choosing some orthonormal basis |ABI〉 for Alice–Bob and |FI〉 for
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where X is the matrix representation of X ,









J,J′ = 〈ABJ|P†a±⊗Q†b± |ABJ′〉∗ . (6.32)









= p(a±,b±) . (6.33)
The optimisation problem is now to find the 256 matrix entries of X subject to
the 64 constraints in equation (6.33) to maximise Eve’s accessible information





In this chapter, we will choose a basis for Alice and Bob to write out our equations.
Once a basis is chosen, the constraints for Eve can be written out explicitly.
This chapter consists of two sections. In section 7.1, we pick the plus basis as
the basis we shall work in for Alice and Bob. In section 7.2, we pick a basis for
Eve which corresponds to taking the Hermitian square root of her reduced state
X†X as the choice for X .
7.1 Alice–Bob’s basis
While the basis choice does not affect Eve’s strategy or the final information Eve
can attain, it does however affect the number of pages needed to write down Eve’s
constraints and input states in full.





|ABI〉 |EI〉 . (7.1)
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Once we specify the Alice–Bob basis |ABI〉, Eve’s record states |EI〉 is also fixed
by the purification. We shall choose the plus states as a basis for Alice–Bob,
|ABI〉= |a+,b+〉 (7.2)
where I = 4(a−1)+b. With this basis choice, the matrix elements
(Pa±⊗Qb±)J,J′ = 〈ABJ|Pa±⊗Qb± |ABJ′〉 (7.3)














∣∣Pn± |a+〉〈b′+∣∣Qm± |b+〉〈Ea′,b′∣∣Ea,b〉 (7.5)
for n,m ∈ {1,2,3,4}.
We divide these 64 constraints into three groups. The first group with 16
constraints is when both Alice and Bob measure in the plus basis. We call these the
short constraints. The second group is when Alice and Bob measure in a different
basis. The 32 constraints in this group are called the medium constraints. The
final group is when both Alice and Bob measure in the minus basis. This gives
the final 16 constraints which we call the long constraints.
7.1.1 Short constraints
An example of the short constraint would be when Alice gets the outcome n± =
1+ and Bob obtains m±= 1+. The probability for this outcome is p(1+,1+) =
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(4−3ε)/64, and so this constraint reads
〈
E1,1
∣∣E1,1〉= 4−3ε16 . (7.6)
A second example is when n± = 1+ and m± = 2+. The probability for this
outcome is p(1+,2+) = ε/64, which gives the constraint
〈
E1,2
∣∣E1,2〉= ε16 . (7.7)
The 16 probabilities when Alice and Bob both measure in the plus basis determine
the norm of all of Eve’s 16 record states
〈
Ea,b
∣∣Ea,b〉= 4−3ε16 for a = b , (7.8)〈
Ea,b
∣∣Ea,b〉= ε16 for a 6= b . (7.9)
We call these 16 equations the short constraints. The double indices on
∣∣Ea,b〉
correspond to the single index on |EI〉 by the relation I = 4(a−1)+b.
7.1.2 Medium constraints
As an example of the medium constraint, consider the case when Alice gets the
outcome 1+ and Bob measures in the minus basis and get the outcome 1−. The



























∣∣E1,4〉+〈E1,4∣∣E1,2〉+〈E1,4∣∣E1,3〉= 0 , (7.11)




∣∣E1,3〉+Re〈E1,2∣∣E1,4〉+Re〈E1,3∣∣E1,4〉= 0 . (7.12)
A second example is for Alice to get the outcome 1+ and Bob gets the outcome

















Substituting the short constraints, this simplifies to
−Re〈E1,1∣∣E1,3〉+Re〈E1,1∣∣E1,4〉−Re〈E1,3∣∣E1,4〉= 0 . (7.14)
In total there are 32 of such constraints on the real parts that we get when Alice
and Bob measure in different bases. We call these the medium constraints. These
constraints are written out in full in appendix B.
7.1.3 Long constraints
The long constraints arise when Alice and Bob both measure in the minus basis.
For example, the probability for Alice to get the outcome 1− and Bob to get the






∣∣1−〉〈1− ∣∣a+〉〈b′+ ∣∣1−〉〈1− ∣∣b+〉〈Ea′,b′∣∣Ea,b〉= 4−3ε64 .
(7.15)
This constraint would have 81 different inner products when written in full. How-
































We call these the long constraints. The 16 long constraints are given in ap-
pendix B.
7.2 Eve’s basis
Once Eve decides on an eavesdropping strategy, the inner products of her records,
that is all the terms in
〈
EI




∣∣EJ〉 where we recall that the square root X = ∑16I=1 |EI〉〈FI|.
We are still free to choose an arbitrary basis |FI〉 which will determine the choice
of the square root X . We shall choose such that X is Hermitian. A different choice
of X would amount to a unitary transformation on the basis |FI〉.
We choose a basis for Eve so that X† = X . This is obtained by first diagonal-







with λI ≥ 0 and
〈φI∣∣φI′〉= δI,I′ , and then choosing the square root to be




|φI〉λI 〈φI| . (7.18)
In these basis (for Alice–Bob and Eve), Eve’s input states would have the matrix
representation
ρEa±,b± = X (Pa±⊗Qb±)X . (7.19)
We will work with these matrices in the remaining chapters of this part of the




Solving the equations for easy cases
Before going to the general case, we shall look at three easy cases that can be
solved analytically. In section 8.1, we look at the case when there is no noise in
the channel. In section 8.2, we look at the case where there is a lot noise for which
we already know from the intercept and resend attack that Eve will be able to get
full information. Section 8.3 looks into the special case when Alice and Bob do a
complete tomography on the state that they receive.
8.1 No noise: ε = 0
We want to find all possible solutions to Eve’s record states when there is no noise.
When there is no noise, the short constraints becomes
〈
E1,1





∣∣Ei, j〉 = 0 when i 6= j. And from Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, the inner
products
∣∣〈Ei, j∣∣Ei′, j′〉∣∣2 ≤ 〈Ei, j∣∣Ei, j〉〈Ei′, j′∣∣Ei′, j′〉 (8.2)
= 0 (8.3)
when i 6= j or when i′ 6= j′. With this all of the medium constraints are automati-








∣∣E3,3〉= Re〈E2,2∣∣E4,4〉= Re〈E3,3∣∣E4,4〉= 14
(8.4)
which means that all four non-zero record states are equal
|E1,1〉= |E2,2〉= |E3,3〉= |E4,4〉 . (8.5)






which is a separable state between Alice–Bob and Eve. In this case even before
doing error correction, the raw keys between Alice and Bob are already perfectly
correlated and Eve has no information about it.
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8.2 A lot of noise: ε≥ 2/3
In this section we shall examine what are Eve’s possible strategies when she is
allowed to add a large amount of noise. In section 4.3.1 we had an intercept and
resend strategy where Eve gains full information at a noise level ε = 2/3. Here,
we find what is the equivalent entanglement based attack corresponding to that
prepare and send attack.
In the prepare and send scenario, there is a noisy channel between Alice and
Bob. We recall that in this channel, for the particular value of ε = 2/3, Eve mea-
sures the incoming two-qubit state in either the plus or minus basis. She then
forwards the outcome of her measurement with probability 3/4 and with proba-
bility 1/4 she forwards the state with the opposite parity. We can describe this
channel E by its action on a positive operator ρ












































































for n ∈ {1,2,3,4}.
The more general channel corresponding to the intercept and resend schemes
in section 4.3.2 for noise values of ε > 2/3 can be found in a similarly straight-
forward manner. For that intercept and resend scheme, a particular state ρ would









p0 |n+〉〈n+|+ p2 |n−〉〈n−|+ ∑
m6=n











p0 |n−〉〈n−|+ p2 |n+〉〈n+|+ ∑
m6=n





where p0, p1, p2 and p3 are the probabilities introduced in section 4.3.2 of which


























































for n,m ∈ {1,2,3,4}. Through straightforward but tedious computations, it turns
out that the channel does not depend on the probabilities pi.
We now want to obtain the pure state |Ψ〉ABE which corresponds to this chan-
nel. The intercept and resend attack is equivalent to Eve sending Alice and Bob a
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p0 |n+〉〈n+|+ p2 |n−〉〈n−|+ ∑
m6=n









p0 |n−〉〈n−|+ p2 |n+〉〈n+|+ ∑
m6=n











a · · · · x1 x3 x3 · x3 x1 x3 · x3 x3 x1
. b · · x2 · x4 x4 x4 · x3 x5 x4 · x5 x3
. · b · x4 x3 · x5 x2 x4 · x4 x4 x5 · x3
. · · b x4 x3 x5 · x4 x5 x3 · x2 x4 x4 .
. x2 x4 x4 b · · · · x4 x3 x5 · x4 x5 x3
x1 · x3 x3 · a · · x3 · x1 x3 x3 · x3 x1
x3 x4 · x5 . · b · x4 x2 · x4 x5 x4 · x3
x3 x4 x5 · · · · b x5 x4 x3 · x4 x2 x4 .
. x4 x2 x4 · x3 x4 x5 b · · · · x5 x4 x3
x3 · x4 x5 x4 · x2 x4 · b · · x5 · x4 x3
x1 x3 · x3 x3 x1 · x3 · · a · x3 x3 · x1
x3 x5 x4 · x5 x3 x4 · · · · b x4 x4 x2 .
. x4 x4 x2 · x3 x5 x4 · x5 x3 x4 b · · .
x3 · x5 x4 x4 · x4 x2 x5 · x3 x4 · b · .
x3 x5 · x4 x5 x3 · x4 x4 x4 · x2 · · b .




where x denotes the negative of x and the dots are zeros. The magnitudes a =
(4−3ε)/16 and b = ε/16 while the inner products xi are
x1 = x2 =
1− ε
16 ,






all of which does not depend on the probability pi. The reason for distinguishing
between x1 and x2 for example will be clear when we generalise Eve’s attack in
the next chapter. These inner products define the attack that Eve does.
This matrix is diagonalised in appendix C and using the formulation in chap-
ter 6, we can check that Eve gets full information about Alice and Bob’s bits when
she uses this attack.
8.3 Full tomography solution
For completeness, we note that if Alice and Bob were allowed to do full to-



















x2 = x3 = x4 = x5 = 0 .
(8.17)
For this attack, |Ψ〉AB is an eigenvector of the state ρAB with an eigenvalue of
(16−15ε)/16. The remaining 15 eigenvectors are degenerate and have eigenval-
ues of ε/16. Eve’s sub-normalised input state when Alice obtains an outcome




√ρAB |n+,m+〉〈n+,m+|√ρAB† . (8.18)
We use the symbol ‘∼’ to denote unitary equivalence. To compute Eve’s infor-
mation, we need to find the eigenvalues for Eve’s input states when say Alice

























while for n = m,












































where |φn±〉 are properly normalised. We can also see that the four vectors
√ρAB |1±,m±〉 for m ∈ {1,2,3,4} are orthogonal. From this it follows that Eve’s






























We now proceed to find the eigenvalues for Eve’s total state. Eve’s total state
when Alice announces a type 1 is unitarily equivalent to
ρEA=1 ∼ 2∑
m
√ρAB (|1+,m+〉〈1+,m+|+ |1−,m−〉〈1−,m−|)√ρAB† (8.26)










The first six eigenvectors for this state are
{|1+,2+〉 , |1+,3+〉 , |1+,4+〉 , |1−,2−〉 , |1−,3−〉 , |1−,4−〉} (8.28)
which have eigenvalues ε/8 and the final two eigenvectors are proportional to
{|φ1+〉+ |φ1−〉 , |φ1+〉− |φ1−〉} (8.29)
















































Figure 8.1: Plot of Eve’s information (in red) and the mutual information between
Alice and Bob (in blue) as a function of the unbiased noise level ε when Alice and
Bob can do a complete tomography of their state for the direct communication
protocol. The two curves intersect at ε = 0.279621.
Putting this together with the entropies of Eve’s input states (8.25), the maximum














)≥ IE . (8.34)
This is plotted in figure 8.1 together with the mutual information between Alice
and Bob that we had in section 4.4. Eve’s information intersects Alice and Bob’s
information at ε = 0.279621. This corresponds to a bit error rate of Q = 0.13981.
The maximum information transferred per signal is obtained from the differ-
ence of Alice and Bob’s mutual information and Eve’s information
rk = IAB− IE . (8.35)
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Figure 8.2: Plot of the bit rates for the direct communication protocol when Eve is
restricted to a tomographic attack (in red) and the tomographic six-states protocol
(in blue) as a function of the bit error rate.
This quantity would be called the key rate if we used the protocol to distribute
random keys instead of sending a message. We compare this with the key rate for
the fully tomographic six-state protocol in figure 8.2. The key rate for the six-state
protocol becomes zero when the error rate is greater than Q = 0.126193 [13, 34].
The tomographic version of the direct communication protocol has a higher key





The optimisation problem as stated at the end of chapter 6 as it stands is quite
intractable analytically. There are 256 variables with 64 constraints, of which
only 49 are independent. The function to be optimised, the Holevo quantity, is
nonlinear and we have to optimise this subject to the positivity constraints on
Eve’s reduced state. With the 49 constraints, we have 207 free parameters to
optimise.
To make the problem tractable, we impose some additional constraints on
Eve’s records. These constraints were partly motivated by a numerical search
on the optimisation problem. For example, we shall insist that Eve uses the same
strategy to discriminate against the plus parity states as she does against the minus
parity states.
After imposing these additional constraints, we can reduce Eve’s free parame-
ters to just four. At this point we can use standard variational methods to optimise
the remaining parameters to obtain Eve’s maximum information.
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In sections 9.1 and 9.2 of this chapter we impose a parity symmetry and nu-
meral symmetry on Eve’s attacks. After imposing these symmetry constraints, we
diagonalise Eve’s reduced state in section 9.3. The optimisation for Eve’s infor-
mation will be carried out in section 9.4. Finally in section 9.5, we calculate Eve’s
information and from there find the efficiency of the protocol.
9.1 Parity symmetry
We want Eve’s different inputs to be unitarily equivalent if we swap the parity and
that the unitary operator does not depend on the numeral type. That is we insist
that
ρEa+,b+ = U†PρEa−,b−UP (9.1)
for some unitary operator UP that does not depend on a and b. This constraint is
motivated by the fact that the plus and minus basis play equal roles. They are on
equal footing and we do not expect Eve to gain by treating one basis differently
from the second. From equation (6.30), this constraint requires that the elements










where UP is the matrix representation for UP with matrix elements
(UP)J,J′ = 〈FJ|UP |FJ′〉 . (9.3)
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(VP)J,J′ = 〈ABJ|VP |ABJ′〉 . (9.5)
By construction
VP (Pa+⊗Qb+)V †P = Pa−⊗Qb− (9.6)
and its equivalent matrix relation
VP (Pa+⊗Qb+)V †P = Pa−⊗Qb− . (9.7)
Finally, substituting























which will be satisfied if we impose the condition that X commutes with V ∗P and
set UP = V ∗P :
X = V TP XV
∗
P . (9.10)
This imposes an additional 104 independent constraints to our equations. This
reduces the number of free parameters from 207 down to 103.
9.2 Numeral symmetry
To further reduce the number of free parameters we impose another symmetry re-
quirement on Eve’s input. We require that if Alice and Bob re-label their numeral
labels cyclically, Eve’s record states should remain unitarily equivalent. In fact
we insist on a stronger condition that when we permute one index to the next in
the cyclic permutation, the unitary transformation for Eve’s record states does not
depend on the index.
Repeating the analysis done for the parity symmetry, we impose the condition
that




(VN1)J,J′ = 〈ABJ|VN1 |ABJ′〉 (9.12)
99
and
VN1 =(|1+〉〈2+|− |2+〉〈3+|+ |3+〉〈4+|+ |4+〉〈1+|)A
⊗ (|1+〉〈2+|− |2+〉〈3+|+ |3+〉〈4+|+ |4+〉〈1+|)B
(9.13)
which permutes the numeral indices from 1→ 2→ 3→ 4→ 1. This gives another
78 more independent equations, bringing the number of free parameters to 25.
We impose a last symmetry for Eve’s records
VN2 =(|1+〉〈3+|+ |3+〉〈2+|− |2+〉〈4+|+ |4+〉〈1+|)A
⊗ (|1+〉〈3+|+ |3+〉〈2+|− |2+〉〈4+|+ |4+〉〈1+|)B
(9.14)
which permutes the numeral indices from 1→ 3→ 2→ 4→ 1. This gives another
21 more independent equations, bringing the number of free parameters to four.
Labelling the remaining parameters as x1,x2,x3,x4,x5 we have five parameters
to optimise with one constraint on the sum





These parameters correspond to the entries in the matrix X †X . With these con-
straints, the matrix X †X takes the form
〈
EI
∣∣EJ〉= (X †X )I,J =

a · · · · x1 x3 x3 · x3 x1 x3 · x3 x3 x1
· b · · x2 · x4 x4 x4 · x3 x5 x4 · x5 x3
· · b · x4 x3 · x5 x2 x4 · x4 x4 x5 · x3
· · · b x4 x3 x5 · x4 x5 x3 · x2 x4 x4 ·
· x2 x4 x4 b · · · · x4 x3 x5 · x4 x5 x3
x1 · x3 x3 · a · · x3 · x1 x3 x3 · x3 x1
x3 x4 · x5 · · b · x4 x2 · x4 x5 x4 · x3
x3 x4 x5 · · · · b x5 x4 x3 · x4 x2 x4 ·
· x4 x2 x4 · x3 x4 x5 b · · · · x5 x4 x3
x3 · x4 x5 x4 · x2 x4 · b · · x5 · x4 x3
x1 x3 · x3 x3 x1 · x3 · · a · x3 x3 · x1
x3 x5 x4 · x5 x3 x4 · · · · b x4 x4 x2 ·
· x4 x4 x2 · x3 x5 x4 · x5 x3 x4 b · · ·
x3 · x5 x4 x4 · x4 x2 x5 · x3 x4 · b · ·
x3 x5 · x4 x5 x3 · x4 x4 x4 · x2 · · b ·




where x denotes the negative of x and the dots are zeros. The magnitudes a = (4−
3ε)/16 and b = ε/16. The negative signs in one of the terms in equations (9.13)
and (9.14) were inserted so that this matrix is similar to the one we obtained in
section 8.2 for the intercept and resend attack.
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9.3 Diagonalising Eve’s attack
After imposing the symmetry constraints, we are left with a manageable problem.
The 16 by 16 matrix X †X can be diagonalised which will also give the Schmidt
decomposition of Eve’s pure state between Alice–Bob and Eve. These eigenvec-
tors are given in appendix C.
From this we can also get the eigenvalues of the matrix representing Eve’s









16 (ε+16x2−32x3 +32x4) ,
µ8,9,10 =
1






16 (ε−16x2 +64x4 +32x5) ,
µ15,16 =
1
16 (ε−16x2−32x4 +32x5) .
(9.16)
The parameters x2, x3, x4 and x5 must be chosen such that these eigenvalues are
positive.
9.4 Optimisation problem




2ρEa−. Our assumptions on Eve’s records ensure that her reduced states












which depends on ε only. Also the combined state ρEa has eigenvalues
λ1 =
1






8 (ε−16x3 +16x4−16x5) ,
λ5,6 =
1
8 (ε+16x3−16x4 +16x5) ,
λ7 =
1





for all a ∈ {1,2,3,4}. Hence to maximise the Holevo quantity, we need to max-







λi logλi , (9.19)
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where λi are the non zero eigenvalues of ρEa . There are four parameters to opti-
mise: x2,x3,x4 and x5. The entropy will be extremised when
∂S
∂x j








































where the first term in the third equality above vanishes because the sum of the
eigenvalues ∑λi = 1.
At this point, we want to find solutions to these equations for which Eve’s total
state remains positive. It turns out that there are two families of solutions. The
first is when the noise level ε is greater than or equal to 2/3 and as we shall see
in the next sub-section, these solutions will give Eve full information. The second
family is when ε is less than 2/3. For these solutions, Eve will no longer be able
to gain full information.
9.4.1 A lot of noise: ε≥ 2/3
We start with the case when the noise level ε is greater than or equal to 2/3. Taking




























provided that non of the eigenvalues are zero. This simplifies to
(ε+16x2−32x4)× (ε+16x2 +64x3 +32x4)
× (ε−16x2 +32x4)−1× (8−7ε−16x2−64x3−32x4)−1 = 1 .
(9.26)





(ε+16x3−16x4 +16x5)× (ε+16x2 +64x3 +32x4)2








(ε−16x2 +32x4)× (ε−16x3 +16x4−16x5)
× (ε+16x2 +64x3 +32x4)× (ε+16x2−32x4)−1






=⇒ x5× (x4− x3)−1 = 1 . (9.32)
The solutions to these four equations, parametrised by a parameter α are
x2 = 2α ,
x3 =
1
16 (1− ε−16α) ,
x4 = α ,
x5 =
1
16 [32α− (1− ε)] .
(9.33)
The choice of α must satisfy the requirement that Eve’s total state XX † has pos-
itive eigenvalues. Substituting this solution into the eigenvalues, the eigenvalues
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16 (2− ε−96α) ,






















that does not depend on α and gives Eve full information. The class of intercept
and resend attacks in section 8.2 is a special case of the solution when α = (1−
ε)/32.
9.4.2 Not so much noise: ε < 2/3
When ε < 2/3, the solutions in the previous sub-section are no longer admissible
as they will make Eve’s total state negative. The first two eigenvalues of XX † to
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become negative are the eigenvalues
µ15,16 =
1
16 (ε−16x2−32x4 +32x5) . (9.37)
Setting these to zero, we can write x5 in terms of the remaining parameters
x5 = x4 +
1
2
x2− 132ε . (9.38)
The combined state ρEa now has eigenvalues
λ1 =
1









16 (ε+16x2 +32x3) ,
λ7 =
1









∂x4 = 0 give three equa-







× (ε+16x2 +64x3 +32x4) × (ε−16x2 +32x4)−1







(ε+16x2 +32x3)× (ε+16x2 +64x3 +32x4)2
× (3ε−16x2−32x3)−1× (8−7ε−16x2−64x3−32x4)−2 = 1 .
(9.43)
From the final equation
∂S
∂x4
= 0 , (9.44)
we get
(ε−16x2 +32x4)× (ε+16x2 +64x3 +32x4)
× (ε+16x2−32x4)−1× (8−7ε−16x2−64x3−32x4)−1 = 1 .
(9.45)
Equation (9.45) follows from equations (9.41) and (9.43). The solutions to these







ε(1− ε)+16x2(1− ε)−16x4(2− ε)
]
. (9.46)
Substituting this into equation (9.43), we obtain a cubic equation in x2 with coef-





















The solution to this equation can be written as
x2 = g2(ε)+2α ,
x3 = g3(ε)−α ,
x4 = α
(9.48)
which is parametrised by α and where g2 and g3 are functions of ε only. The func-
























From these solutions we obtain the eigenvalues of Eve’s total state ρEa , all of which












16 (ε+16g2 +32g3) ,
λ7 =
1





We plot the eigenvalues as a function of ε in figure 9.1.
From the eigenvalues we can calculate the bound on the mutual information
between Eve and Alice. Any value of α for which XX † is positive is admissible
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Figure 9.1: Plot of the eigenvalues of Eve’s conditional state ρEa as a function of
the noise level.









16 (ε+16g2−32g3 +96α) ,
µ8,9,10 =
1




µ14 = 6α ,
µ15,16 = 0 .
(9.52)
The eigenvalues µ2,3,4, µ8,9,10 and µ15,16 do not depend on α and they are non-
negative for all values of 0 ≤ ε ≤ 2/3. The remaining eigenvalues are positive as
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Figure 9.2: Plot showing the admissible region of the parameter α for which the






for which a solution always exists. This range is plotted in figure 9.2.
9.5 Eve’s information and protocol efficiency















which is an achievable bound on Eve’s information. This is plotted in figure 9.3
together with the mutual information between Alice and Bob that we had in sec-
tion 4.4. From the intersection of the two curves, we find that the noise threshold
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Figure 9.3: Plot of Eve’s information (in red) and the mutual information between
Alice and Bob (in blue) as a function of the unbiased noise level ε for Eve’s opti-
mal attack. The two curves intersect at ε0 = 0.154969.
for secure communication is ε0 = 0.154969 which corresponds to an error rate of
Q = 0.0774845.
The maximum information transferred per signal is obtained from the differ-
ence of Alice and Bob’s mutual information and Eve’s information
rk = IAB− IE . (9.55)
We compare this quantity with the key rate from the BB84 protocol in figure 9.4.
The key rate for the BB84 protocol becomes zero when the error rate is greater
than Q = 0.110028 [13,51]. The BB84 protocol has a higher key rate compared to
the direct communication protocol for all values of error rate below its threshold.
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Figure 9.4: Plot of the bit rates for the direct communication protocol (in red) and




In the first part of the thesis, we found some plausible upper bounds on Eve’s in-
formation. To derive these bounds, we had to impose some symmetry constraints
to reduce the number of free parameters for Eve’s attack.
Without imposing the symmetry constraints, a numerical search was carried
out to determine the optimal solution using Monte-Carlo methods. The only con-
straints imposed on Eve’s attack was that the joint probability table between Alice
and Bob should be consistent with an unbiased noise channel. No solutions were
found that were better than the known solution. But this does not say much since
the dimension of the search space is exceedingly large.
At this point, we can ask the following question: Is it possible to restrict Eve’s
attack if we allow Alice and Bob to perform some random processing on their
qubits before measuring them? The method of introducing random processing on
the data to achieve an upper bound on Eve’s information was first presented by
Kraus, Gisin and Renner in [29]. In appendix D, we show that if we allow Alice
and Bob were to perform some random operations on their qubits, to get an upper
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bound on Eve’s information, the state of Eve’s ancilla can be parametrised by only
nine parameters. The checks that Alice and Bob do on their measurement statistics
would put further constraints on this state. By doing this random processing, the
number of parameters for Eve in her attack can be naturally reduced.
In this thesis we have not discussed the error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion parts of the protocol. These would come after knowing how much informa-
tion Eve can obtain. If we use this protocol for key distribution, these procedures
are well known and can be easily adapted to the needs of this protocol.
However to use the protocol for direct communication, things are not so sim-
ple. If the message itself is being transmitted, then Eve could possibly intercept
the message and gain partial knowledge of its contents. It is too late to perform an
analogue of a ‘privacy amplification’ procedure as in a key distribution protocol.
It would be interesting to see if Alice can still transmit a deterministic and
secret message to Bob. One way to achieve this is to have Alice suitably encrypt
her message such that Bob would be able to decipher perfectly but Eve would
not be able to obtain any information. How much encryption Alice needs to per-
form would depend on the amount of information Eve has on the raw data. By
encrypt, we mean that Alice pre-processes her message using a publicly known
error correcting and privacy amplification scheme prior to sending it to Bob.
The complete details for such pre-processing would need more study. But
roughly speaking, Alice will encode the raw bits that she sends with redundancies
by reversing Bob’s decoding process. For example, to send the message x, Al-
ice will first need to find a longer message y such that hm(y) = x, where hm is a
randomly chosen hashing function from a suitable universal class of hashing func-
tions. This encoding is the analogue of the privacy amplification step in quantum
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key distribution. It is to ensure that even if Eve has some partial knowledge on y,
she cannot learn anything about the actual message x. Of course the problem with
this is that by definition a universal hashing function does not have an inverse. It
is hard to find y given x.
Instead, say Alice creates the string y. With this, she can deterministically
and securely send the message x = hm(y) to Bob. In other words, Alice will
know what the message will be before she decides to transmit it. But she cannot
deterministically choose her message.
Before Bob can apply hm to learn about the actual message x, he needs to have
the error-free string y. To ensure Bob can get the error-free string, Alice has to do
one more step of encoding using error correcting codes. She would need to find
the message z such that g(z) = g(z′) = y, where z′ is the message that Bob receives
which is corrupted by the expected amount of error in the transmission and g is the
error correcting protocol. Alice will then perform one way communication. She
sends some classical bits to Bob so that Bob can correct all his errors. How much
classical information Alice needs to send will depend on the mutual information
between Alice and Bob. After Bob has an error-free string y, Alice will then reveal
the actual function hm so that Bob can get the actual message x.
The reason that the encrypting process can be done prior to Alice sending her
signal is because of the fact that the protocol is deterministic. Hence Alice knows
that the final result of Bob’s successful decoding is just her original message. In
a conventional quantum key distribution protocol, it would not be possible (nor
would it be necessary) for Alice to do such encryption prior to sending her signals
because of the random nature of Bob’s raw bits and also the final key.
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We remark that since some amount of post-processing needs to be performed
between Alice and Bob, the protocol is not really a direct communication protocol
in the strictest sense. Alice still needs to send classical bits to Bob in order for
Bob to recover her message. It can then be said that since Alice still needs to send
classical bits to Bob anyway, then there is not much advantage of this protocol
over a key distribution protocol.
A major concern for the protocol that we have briefly mentioned in the in-
troduction is its performance in the presence of channel loss. In most discrete
variable quantum key distribution protocols, lost qubits (or qudits) do not con-
tribute to the error rate because such events are simply rejected. But in a direct
communication protocol, a lost signal means that some information on the mes-
sage itself is lost. Therefore the lost signals have to be accounted as errors when
characterising the channel. For such events, Bob would randomly choose a bit ‘0’
or ‘1’ to fill in his empty slots. If the error rate is not too large, then the post-
processing procedures will be able to correct for these errors. To minimise Eve’s
information, Alice should not reveal her numeral type for lost events. However
if the channel loss is too high, this will lead to a high noise level. If the noise
level is beyond what the protocol can tolerate, then it will have to be aborted and
Alice and Bob have to restart. Each time they restart the protocol, Alice will have
to start from the beginning. She cannot make use of the signals that Bob had re-
ceived in their previous attempts. That is, she has to make new basis choices and
a new choice of hashing function to encrypt her entire message. This is to ensure
that any information that Eve had gained from the failed communication attempts
cannot be used to eavesdrop on the current attempt.
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Including the effects of loss, the joint state between Alice and Bob would be
ρAB = [|Ψ〉AB 〈Ψ|AB (1− ε)+ ε]η+(1−η) (10.1)
= |Ψ〉AB 〈Ψ|AB (1− ε)η+ εη+(1−η) , (10.2)
where η is the channel transmission. The effective noise parameter would be
ε′ = εη + (1−η). We need this quantity to be less than the noise threshold of
0.155.
In the thesis, we investigated how much information Eve could potentially
gain if she were to attack Alice. We can also repeat the analysis to see how
much information she can gain if she attacks Bob instead. When Eve chooses
to attack Bob, her input states are given at the end of section 5.3.3. But we do
not expect Eve to learn more information from Bob then she can from Alice.
This is because Alice publicly reveals her numeral type whilst Bob does not have
to reveal anything. If this expectation is true, then the protocol will be more
efficient if Alice and Bob were to do a direct communication version of reverse
reconciliation.
Extension of the protocol to finite bit lengths also remains to be done. Typi-
cally the message that Alice wants to send would be of a relatively short length.
The amount of data that is needed to characterise the channel up to some confi-
dence may end up to be longer than the actual message itself. This question still
needs to be addressed.
An experimental setup for the protocol was proposed in section 3.3. This uses
two degrees of freedom of a single photon to encode a qubit-pair and the setup is
relatively simple to implement. However the sensitivity of the protocol to losses
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means that the detector efficiency is a critical factor for experiments. Detector
efficiency refers to the fraction of photons registered to the number of photons
impinging on the detector. To establish a secure key, the detection efficiency has
to be at least η = 0.845. Avalanche photo diodes are the most commonly used
detectors in quantum key distribution protocols. Good thick junction silicon single
photon avalanche photo diodes have peak efficiency of around 0.7 near 800 nm,
falling to 0.03 at 1064 nm [11,14]. Using superconducting transition edge sensors,
better detection efficiencies of up to 0.95 at 1556 nm was achieved by Lita in
2008 [33, 44]. However, these detectors have slower count rates and need to be
cooled to temperatures less than 100 mK.
Based on the above discussions, we can conclude that the direct communica-
tion protocol can already be implemented as a proof-of-principle type of experi-
ment. However to be seriously considered as an alternative to key distribution pro-
tocols, we would need to wait for technological developments that lead to faster






Equivalence of Alice-prepares and
Alice-measures protocols
In the original protocol, Alice prepares a state ρB and forwards this through a
quantum channel E to Bob. The resulting state that Bob gets will be ρ˜B =E (ρB).
In this appendix, we provide an explicit construction of this channel in terms
of a pure state shared between Alice–Bob and Eve. Every input state to the chan-
nel would correspond to a POVM outcome for Alice. The output of the channel
corresponds to the reduced state for Bob.
We describe the channel E as a unitary transformation UBE acting on the input
state ρB and an ancillary state |e1〉. The output state E (ρB) is obtained by tracing
out the ancillary subsystem at the end of the unitary evolution






The maximum dimension of the ancillary state |e1〉 needed to specify an arbitrary
channel is d2, where d is the dimension of Hilbert space of the input states [39].
We can also write this in the Kraus representation
ρB → ρ˜B = ∑
k
〈ek|UBE |e1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
F(B)k








where the vectors |ek〉 extends |e1〉 to an orthonormal basis. The operators F(B)k







which is a condition on the preservation of the trace of the output states. This
representation is equivalent to specifying the action of the channel on a set of d2
linearly independent state vectors (for example the SIC-POVM [41]).
The choice of basis vectors for Eve |ek〉 for k ∈ {1,2, . . . ,d2} are arbitrary.
We also specify an arbitrary set of d orthonormal basis vectors for Alice |an〉 and
an arbitrary set for Bob |bm〉 for {n,m} ∈ {1,2, . . . ,d}. In this basis, the Kraus
operators have matrix elements
〈bn|F(B)k |bm〉= 〈bn,ek|UBE |bm,e1〉 . (A.5)
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The matrix elements for the output state become




〈bn,ek|UBE |bm′ ,e1〉〈bm′ |ρB |bn′〉〈bn′ ,e1|U†BE |bm,ek〉 .
(A.6)
The correspondence between the state that Alice prepares in the original pro-
tocol and the POVM outcome she projects onto is obtained via the pure maximally
entangled state between Alice and Bob
|Ψtrue〉= ∑
n
|an,bn〉 1√d . (A.7)
To prepare a state ρB, Alice projects onto the POVM outcome piA such that
ρB = TrA {(piA⊗1B) |Ψtrue〉〈Ψtrue|} (A.8)
=
1
d ∑n,m〈am|piA |an〉 |bn〉〈bm| (A.9)
or in terms of the matrix elements
〈bn|ρB |bm〉= 1d 〈am|piA |an〉 . (A.10)
At this point, we want to find the states
∣∣Ei, j〉 that correspond to a channel E ,
such that for every ρB, the output δB
δB ≡ TrA {(piA⊗1BE) |Ψ〉〈Ψ|}= E (ρB) (A.11)
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pia = d ∑
n,m
|am〉〈bn|ρB |bm〉〈an| . (A.13)
The output state δB is














∣∣En,m〉 |bm〉〈bm′ | (A.16)
which have matrix elements






















∣∣En,m〉〈bn|ρB |an′〉〈En′,m′∣∣ek〉√d . (A.19)
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Comparing this with the matrix elements of the output of the channel described





∣∣En,m〉= 〈bm,ek|UBE |bn,e1〉 (A.20)
=⇒ |En,m〉= 1√d ∑k |ek〉〈bm,ek|UBE |bn,e1〉 (A.21)





This appendix lists out the 64 constraints on the inner products between Eve’s
probe states after choosing the basis as in chapter 7. Of these 64 constraints, only
49 of them are independent.
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B.1 Short constraints
The 16 short constraints are obtained when both Alice and Bob measure in the




































There are 32 medium constraints. Sixteen of them are from the cases when Alice

































































Note that not all of the above equations are independent. For example, every
fourth equation can be obtained from the previous three.
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The remaining 16 medium constraints are obtained from the cases when Alice

































































The last four equations can be obtained from the first twelve. There are altogether
24 independent equations from the medium constraints.
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B.3 Long constraints
Finally the 16 long constraints are obtained when both Alice and Bob measure in









































































































































































































































−Re〈E2,3∣∣E3,1〉+Re〈E2,3∣∣E3,2〉 = 3−3ε4 .
Out of these 16 equations, seven are redundant and only nine are independent.
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Appendix C
Schmidt decomposition of Eve’s
attack
In this appendix we will find the Schmidt decomposition of the pure state be-
tween Alice–Bob and Eve after imposing the constraints in chapter 9. With those
constraints, the matrix representation for Eve’s total state XX † can be fully diag-
onalised. In fact, we find the reduced state between Alice and Bob is fixed up to
its eigenvalues.

















The kets |EI〉 are fixed, up to a unitary transformation, by Eve’s strategy. However
the inner products between the kets are uniquely fixed by her strategy. After im-
posing the symmetry constraints, we find that the inner products are parametrised
by five parameters which we call x1, x2, x3, x4 and x5. The entries for the matrix
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a · · · · x1 x3 x3 · x3 x1 x3 · x3 x3 x1
· b · · x2 · x4 x4 x4 · x3 x5 x4 · x5 x3
· · b · x4 x3 · x5 x2 x4 · x4 x4 x5 · x3
· · · b x4 x3 x5 · x4 x5 x3 · x2 x4 x4 ·
· x2 x4 x4 b · · · · x4 x3 x5 · x4 x5 x3
x1 · x3 x3 · a · · x3 · x1 x3 x3 · x3 x1
x3 x4 · x5 · · b · x4 x2 · x4 x5 x4 · x3
x3 x4 x5 · · · · b x5 x4 x3 · x4 x2 x4 ·
· x4 x2 x4 · x3 x4 x5 b · · · · x5 x4 x3
x3 · x4 x5 x4 · x2 x4 · b · · x5 · x4 x3
x1 x3 · x3 x3 x1 · x3 · · a · x3 x3 · x1
x3 x5 x4 · x5 x3 x4 · · · · b x4 x4 x2 ·
· x4 x4 x2 · x3 x5 x4 · x5 x3 x4 b · · ·
x3 · x5 x4 x4 · x4 x2 x5 · x3 x4 · b · ·
x3 x5 · x4 x5 x3 · x4 x4 x4 · x2 · · b ·




where x denotes the negative of x and the dots are zeros. The magnitudes a =
(4− 3ε)/16 and b = ε/16. Not all five parameters are independent. They are
related by the sum




The eigenvectors of this simplified matrix does not depend on any of the parame-
ters or on the noise level ε. The 16 eigenvectors (up to a normalisation constant)
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are given by the columns of the following matrix


1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0














16 (ε+16x2−32x3 +32x4) ,
µ8,9,10 =
1






16 (ε−16x2 +64x4 +32x5) ,
µ15,16 =
1
16 (ε−16x2−32x4 +32x5) .
(C.4)
Having diagonalised X †X , it is now easy to write the Schmidt decomposition of
|Ψ〉ABE between Alice–Bob and Eve.
C.1 Schmidt basis of Alice–Bob


































= φ∗M,JµM . (C.9)
Next, we introduce an orthonormal basis |FN〉 so that
〈
FN





























|αN〉 |FN〉√µN , (C.15)
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= δN,M . (C.19)
Equation (C.15) provides the Schmidt decomposition of Eve’s pure state between
Alice–Bob and Eve. The Schmidt vectors |αN〉 can be obtained from the eigenvec-
tors of X †X in equation (C.4). For example |α1〉 corresponding to the eigenvalue
µ1 would be
|α1〉= |1+,1+〉+ |2+,2+〉+ |3+,3+〉+ |4+,4+〉 . (C.20)
We can also write this state in the Bell basis: |ψi〉AB1⊗
∣∣ψ j〉AB2. Here |ψi〉AB1 are
the Bell basis for Alice’s first qubit and Bob’s first qubit and the Bell basis are
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defined as
|ψ1〉= (|↑↑〉+ |↓↓〉) 1√2 ,
|ψ2〉= (|↑↑〉− |↓↓〉) 1√2 ,
|ψ3〉= (|↑↓〉+ |↓↑〉) 1√2 ,
|ψ4〉= (|↑↓〉− |↓↑〉) 1√2 ,
(C.21)
where the kets |↑〉 and |↓〉 are the computational basis.








then the Schmidt basis for Alice–Bob becomes
|α1〉= |ψ1,ψ1〉 ,
















|α6〉= |ψ2,ψ2〉 1√3 −|ψ2,ψ3〉
1√
3
+ |ψ3,ψ1〉 1√3 ,
|α7〉= |ψ2,ψ1〉 1√3 −|ψ3,ψ2〉
1√
3

























|α14〉= |ψ1,ψ4〉 1√3 + |ψ4,ψ2〉
1√
3


















In this appendix, we show how the optimisation problem for Eve’s information
can be simplified if we let Alice and Bob perform some random processing on
their two-qubits before measurement.
Following [29], for every qubit pair that Alice and Bob receive, Alice decides
with probability half to swap qubits one and two. When Alice swaps her qubits,
she will then tell Bob to do the same.




























(|↑↑〉+ |↓↓〉)AB2 . (D.4)
In this form, it is clear that if the state between Alice and Bob was the true state
(plus unbiased noise), then swapping the first and second qubits should leave the
state unchanged. We also see that for the true state, Alice’s first qubit is only
entangled with Bob’s first qubit.
Suppose the state between Alice and Bob has the purification
∣∣Φ12〉ABE such
that ρ12AB = TrE
{∣∣Φ12〉ABE 〈Φ12∣∣ABE}. When Alice decides to swap or not to swap
based on a random number R1, the effective state between Alice and Bob would




where ρ21AB is obtained by swapping qubits one and two.




(∣∣Φ12〉ABE |12〉R1 + ∣∣Φ21〉ABE |21〉R1) , (D.5)
where the R1 kets are orthonormal.
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We now provide Eve with the R1 system which she can measure after sending
Alice and Bob their qubits. This provides Eve at least as much power as she had
before. Hence it is sufficient to consider the reduced state between Alice and Bob
as obtained by tracing out E and R1. In other words it is sufficient to only consider






























where σ0 = 1, σ1 = σx, σ2 = σy and σ3 = σz are the Pauli operators for Alice. The
superscripts 1 and 2 refer to qubits one and two. The τ operators are Bob’s Pauli
operators following the same convention. The coefficients ca1,a2,b1,b2 make up 256
real numbers constrained by the positivity of ρ and the normalisation condition:
c0000 = 1.
Swapping qubits one and two, the state ρ21AB will have the Pauli coefficients
c21a1,a2,b1,b2 = c
12

























which set the restrictions ca1,a2,b1,b2 = ca2,a1,b2,b1 .
Another set of (local) operations that will leave the true state unchanged is for
Alice and Bob to perform σx⊗τx, σy⊗τy or σz⊗τz on each qubit. For each qubit,
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Alice will randomly decide with equal probability to apply 1, σx, σy or σz. She
then tells Bob to do the same operation on his qubits.
We introduce a second random system R2 which Alice uses to decide which
operation to perform on her qubit pair. By placing this random system in Eve’s
control, we can repeat the argument done for swapping the qubits to show that it
























































































































This state is diagonal in the bell basis |φi〉A1,B1
∣∣φ j〉A2,B2 where |φi〉A1,B1 is one of
the four bell states on the first qubits of Alice and Bob. The state has only sixteen
parameters which can be taken to be the eigenvalues corresponding to each pair
of bell-states. If we include the swapping constraint, this leaves ten undetermined
coefficients (minus one from the normalisation requirement).
At this point, we can further constrain Eve’s state by requiring that Alice and
Bob’s measurement statistics must be consistent with an unbiased noise state. The
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problem now is to optimise the remaining free parameters to maximise Eve’s in-
formation subject to these constraints. We expect this optimisation problem to be
more tractable than the optimisation for the original protocol since the number of




Security analysis of a continuous
variable quantum key distribution





Review of continuous variable
Gaussian states
In this chapter, we collect some well known facts that will be used in analysing the
security of the continuous variable key distribution protocol. We shall restrict our
analysis to Gaussian states and how they transform under Gaussian operations.
Section 11.1 provides some basic definitions concerning coherent states. Next,
section 11.2 introduces the Wigner function which is all that we shall use in the
analysis of the Gaussian eavesdropping attacks. The final two sections give two
examples on the transformations of the Wigner function. Section 11.3 gives an
example for the transformations of a single-mode Gaussian state and section 11.4
gives an example for the transformations a two-mode Gaussian state.
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11.1 The ingredients








where a is the annihilation operator while a† is the creation operator. They obey




= 1 . (11.2)
For our purposes, ~ω are just constants. The eigenstates of the Hermitian operator
a†a are called the Fock states and denoted as |n〉 with corresponding eigenvalues
n.
From the commutation relation, the action of the annihilation and creation
operators on the Fock states can be shown to be
a |n〉= |n−1〉√n , (11.3)
a† |n〉= |n+1〉√n+1 . (11.4)
For the norms of all the states a |n〉 to be non-negative, the eigenvalues n can only
take non-negative integer values n ∈ {0,1,2, . . .∞}. The state |0〉 corresponding
to the eigenvalue n = 0 is given the special name as the vacuum state. It is the
ground state of H, with the eigenenergy ~ω/2.
We are now almost ready to introduce the coherent states. These states shall
serve as the signal states that Alice would send to Bob in our key distribution
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where α is an arbitrary complex number. The coherent state |α〉 is generated by






where k is some proportionality constant. From this definition for the coherent
state, it also follows that the coherent states are eigenstates of the annihilation
operator
a |α〉= |α〉 αk . (11.7)

















The missing steps are worked out in textbooks on quantum mechanics [2, 18, 58].
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Having described operators representing the generation of coherent states which
Alice sends, we now proceed to the operators which represent the measurement
process for Bob. The two measurement operators at Bob’s end are the amplitude















with v being a proportionality constant for Bob to choose at his convenience. Note
that X and Y do not commute which means that Bob cannot measure both X and Y
simultaneously on the same state. In fact the commutator between X and Y turns
out to be




With this definition, we find that when Alice sends the coherent state |α〉, Bob



















k Im(α) . (11.16)
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The variances in the outcomes of X and Y for the state |α〉 will be




Throughout the thesis, we shall set the proportionality constant k = v = 2σV ,
where we have introduced another constant σV . With these definitions, the co-
herent state |α〉 will give the following outcomes
〈α|X |α〉= Re(α) , (11.19)
〈α|Y |α〉= Im(α) , (11.20)
var(X)α = var(Y )α = σ
2
V , (11.21)
where σ2V is by definition the variance of a quadrature measurement on a coherent
state. In this thesis, unless otherwise specified, we set k = v = 1 so that σ2V = 1/4.
11.1.1 Beam splitter matrix
Eve’s basic tool to eavesdrop on Alice’s signal would be the beam splitter. For
the purpose of studying that, we recap how the beam splitter affects the coherent
states.
The beam splitter is represented schematically in figure 11.1 where the two






Figure 11.1: Schematic diagram of a beam splitter with two input ports A and V
and two output ports B and E. The transmittivity of the beam splitter is η.
The output ports of the beam splitter are related to the input ports by the following









where η is the beam splitter transmission coefficient. When we have a coherent
state |αA〉 going through the first input A and a second coherent state |αV 〉 through
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the second input V , the output state can be obtained from the input states as follows




























































The beam splitter affects a rotation of the input quadratures. The output












√η 0 −√1−η 0
0 √η 0 −√1−η
√















For the Gaussian states that we shall be considering here, the beam splitter will
displace the coherent amplitude by ~x′0 = M~x0 and rotate the covariance matrix
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are the coherent amplitudes of the input and output states respectively and C is the




〈 ¯XA ¯XA〉 〈 ¯XA ¯YA〉 〈 ¯XA ¯XV 〉 〈 ¯XA ¯YV 〉
〈 ¯YA ¯XA〉 〈 ¯YA ¯YA〉 〈 ¯YA ¯XV 〉 〈 ¯YA ¯YV 〉
〈 ¯XV ¯XA〉 〈 ¯XV ¯YA〉 〈 ¯XV ¯XV 〉 〈 ¯XA ¯YV 〉








〈 ¯XB ¯XB〉 〈 ¯XB ¯YB〉 〈 ¯XB ¯XE〉 〈 ¯XB ¯YE〉
〈 ¯YB ¯XB〉 〈 ¯YB ¯YB〉 〈 ¯YB ¯XE〉 〈 ¯YB ¯YE〉
〈 ¯XE ¯XB〉 〈 ¯XE ¯YB〉 〈 ¯XE ¯XE〉 〈 ¯XB ¯YE〉





An operator with an over-line denotes the fluctuations of the operator from its




√η 0 −√1−η 0
0 √η 0 −√1−η
√







11.2 Wigner function and general Gaussian states
We introduce another two bases for the single-mode infinite dimensional Hilbert
space. The first basis is comprised of the kets |x〉, the eigenstates of the amplitude
quadrature operator X corresponding to the eigenvalues x ∈ R. The second basis
is comprised of the kets |y〉, the eigenstates of the phase quadrature operators with
eigenvalues y ∈ R.




























The symbol ~= 2σ2v so that the commutation relation between X and Y reads
[X ,Y ] = i~ . (11.38)








The normalisation condition on ρˆ translates to
ZZ
dx dy ρ(x,y) = 1 . (11.41)
The overlap between two states ρˆ1 and ρˆ2 is given by
Tr{ρˆ1ρˆ2}= 2pi~
ZZ
dx dy ρ1(x,y)ρ2(x,y) . (11.42)
11.2.1 n-mode Gaussian states
For an n-mode state ρˆ, the Wigner function is defined as
ρ(~z) =
Z dx˜1 . . .dx˜n
(2pi~)n
〈




∣∣∣∣x1 + x˜12 , . . . ,xn + x˜n2
〉




~z = (x1,y1, . . . ,xn,yn)T . (11.44)
If the state ρˆ is a Gaussian state, then its Wigner function can be written in terms





















d~z ρ1(~z)ρ2(~z) . (11.48)
A unitary Gaussian operator U acting on the Hilbert space H corresponds
to a symplectic transformation S on the phase space of the Wigner function. A
symplectic transformation would evolve the covariance matrix to C → SCST and


















Any symplectic transformation can be realised by a combination of three op-















This squeezes the amplitude quadrature by the factor g. The last operator Smix(η)




√η 0 −√1−η 0
0 √η 0 −√1−η
√







where 0≤ η≤ 1 determines the mixing ratio.
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These three operators can be realised in the lab by the passive components
phase shifters, squeezers and beam splitters respectively. In particular, a local
unitary Gaussian operation on a two-mode system U = U1⊗U2 maps to the lo-
cal symplectic operation S = S1⊕ S2. This locality restriction removes the beam
splitter from our set of operations.
Williamson’s theorem states that any covariance matrix can be brought into
a diagonal form with diagonal entries (κ1,κ1,κ2,κ2, . . . ,κn,κn) via a symplectic
transformation. In this form, the phase space variables are not correlated to each
other, meaning that there always exist a bi-partition in which an n-mode Gaussian
state becomes separable. This also means that any zero mean Gaussian state can
be created in the lab by our set of three passive components on initially uncorre-
lated thermal states. In this form the uncertainty relation becomes κi ≥ σ2V for all
i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} [53].
11.3 Example 1: Single-mode Gaussian states
For a single-mode Gaussian state, we can visualise its Wigner function as an el-
lipse in a two dimensional plane. The centre of this ellipse will correspond to the
mean amplitude. The semi-major and semi-minor axis is proportional to the stan-
dard deviation of the amplitude outcome when measured along those quadratures.









For example, the following ball on stick figure is used to represent the coherent
state |6+2i〉:
















The ball is centred at (6,2) and has radius 1 in units of σv. Applying the squeezing









































The variance in the X quadrature is less than the vacuum noise. But this is at the
expense of a noisier Y quadrature. The ball on stick representation of this state is
shown in the following figure:
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There is no correlation between the X and Y quadratures as seen by the diagonal
covariance matrix and the also by the axis of the ellipse being parallel to the x and
y axes.
Finally if we apply the rotation operator with angle θ = pi/6 to this state, the
mean amplitude would be
µ =

















The covariance matrix becomes
C =













 cos pi6 sin pi6










This state is represented by the following figure:
170
















If we were to measure the X quadrature repeatedly, the outcomes will show a
Gaussian distribution having a mean of value 3.13013 and variance 0.880833σ2V .
There would be some correlation between the X and Y quadratures as seen by the
non zero off diagonal elements in the covariance matrix.
Suppose we measured X and obtained the outcome x = 5.4, if we were to
measure the Y quadrature (not that we could actually measure both quadratures
simultaneously), the conditioned outcome y will have its mean given by
µ2|1 = µ2 +C21C−111 (x−µ1)




The conditional variance is given by








We note that since these symplectic transformations realise unitary transfor-
mations, the purity of the transformed state remains the same. This can be quanti-
fied by the determinant of the covariance matrix which remains unchanged under
a symplectic transformation.
11.4 Example 2: Two squeezed states at arbitrary
angle
This example illustrates the correlations in a two-mode Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) state. The EPR state is created by shining two squeezed states through the
two inputs of a beam splitter.
We begin with an uncorrelated two-mode system. The first mode is the vac-
uum state which is first squeezed in the X quadrature with a squeezing factor g
























sinθcosθ σ2sq sin2 θ+σ2asq cos2 θ

 (11.62)
Here, σ2sq = σ2V/g and σ2asq = gσ2V where the subscripts denote squeezed and anti-
squeezed respectively. They are the variances of the X and Y quadratures respec-
tively before the rotation. This state will be the state through the first input of a
50/50 beam splitter a1 as shown in figure 11.2.
The second mode also starts in the vacuum state but it is first squeezed in the
X quadrature with a squeezing factor 1/g and then rotated by an angle θ. This



























−(σ2sq−σ2asq)sinθcosθ σ2asq sin2 θ+σ2sq cos2 θ

 . (11.65)
This state is then passed through the second input of the beam splitter a2.
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The two input states are shown in the ball on stick representation in figure 11.2.
As we shall see, each of the two output modes turns out to be in a thermal state
when examined individually.






















































σ2th 0 −σ2k cos(2θ) −σ2k sin(2θ)
0 σ2th −σ2k sin(2θ) σ2k cos(2θ)
−σ2k cos(2θ) −σ2k sin(2θ) σ2th 0














/2. From the diagonal blocks,
we see that both of the outputs a3 and a4 of the beam splitter are in a thermal state
with a variance of σ2th. There is no correlation between the X3 and Y3 quadratures
or between the X4 and Y4 quadratures.
But the output a3 is correlated to a4. We want to find out what happens to the
output at a3 given that a measurement of X4 gives the outcome xA. The variable













Figure 11.2: Creation of an EPR state by shining two orthogonally squeezed input
states through a 50/50 beam splitter. The output states are two thermal states
which are correlated to each other.
covariance matrix by ¯Σ12;12. The reduced state will have mean































































































we see that the reduced state is a squeezed state with a minimum variance of
σ4V/σ
2
th. This state is represented in the ball on stick representation in figure 11.3.


















Figure 11.3: Ball on stick representation of a reduced EPR state.
For a fixed squeezing factor g > 1, the magnitude of the mean value is maximum
whilst the variance is minimum when θ = 0. For such a state, the two outputs are
said to be EPR entangled.
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Chapter 12
Introduction to continuous variable
quantum key distribution
Continuous variable quantum key distribution uses a continuous degree of free-
dom to distribute secure keys between Alice and Bob. Typically, the amplitude
and phase quadratures of a Gaussian beam are used to carry the signals.
In single photon implementations of quantum key distribution, when no pho-
tons arrive at Bob’s detector, the signal is simply lost and does not contribute to the
key generation protocol. This is a form of post-selection and the missing events
do not give the eavesdropper any information.
However in continuous variable quantum key distribution with a lossy trans-
mission line, when Alice sends a certain coherent state, Bob would still detect a
coherent state, but having a smaller amplitude. The loss could be due to Eve in-
tercepting some photons and keeping them to herself. Therefore loss would mean
that Eve now has some information regarding the state that Alice sends.
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In this chapter, we will look at how loss affects the security of one of the
first and simplest continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols. In sec-
tion 12.1, we will introduce the protocol. Section 12.2 analyses its performance
in a perfect lossless channel. Finally, in section 12.3 we discuss how loss in the
channel affects the protocol.
12.1 3 dB loss limit without post-selection
The early continuous variable key distribution protocols suffer from the 3 dB loss
limit. When the loss in the channel is greater than 50% no secure key can be
distributed. We recap one such protocol, presented by Grosshans and Grangier in
2002 [23].









j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}. Both x jA and y jA are picked from a Gaussian distribution with












∼N (0,σA) . (12.2)
Alice then prepares a sequence of N coherent states
∣∣α j〉 with the complex ampli-
tudes α j = x jA + iy
j
A.
Bob will choose to measure each coherent state with either the amplitude op-
erator X or phase operator Y .
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12.2 Perfect lossless channel
In a lossless and noiseless channel, Bob will receive the state exactly as what Alice
sent without corruption. Together with a perfect measurement device, the proba-
bility of Bob’s outcome xB when he measures the amplitude quadrature given that
Alice sends the coherent state with amplitude xA + iyA will be
pB(xB|xA)∼N (xA,σV ) . (12.3)
Bob’s outcome given Alice’s signal, will be normally distributed with mean xA
and variance σ2V . So when Bob measures the amplitude quadrature, he will get
some information about the value of xA, but no information about the value of
yA. In this sense there are no mismatched bases; each of Bob’s measurements
gives correlated data. However half of the signals that Alice encodes remains
unmeasured.
The joint probability between Alice and Bob will be


























This describes the raw data between Alice and Bob. The maximum amount of bits
that Alice and Bob can extract from the raw data using the most efficient encoding
algorithm is given by the mutual information between Alice and Bob
IAB =
ZZ
dxA dxB pAB (xA,xB) log
pAB (xA,xB)
pA (xA) pB (xB)
(12.7)
= SA +SB−SAB . (12.8)




∼N (0,σ2V +σ2A) , (12.10)
and SA is the relative entropy of Alice’s data
SA =−
Z










The relative entropy of Bob’s data SB is
SB =−
Z














while the joint relative entropy between Alice and Bob is
SAB =−
ZZ
















































In the last equality, we write the net mutual information in terms of the average











where x2A/σ2V is the signal to noise ratio when Alice sends the signal xA and Bob’s
measurement has a variance σ2V .
At this point Alice and Bob share a correlated set of continuous data and can
in theory get up to 1/2× log(1+Σ) bits of information for every measured data
point. In fact the sliced reconciliation protocol can get arbitrarily close to the
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theoretical limit [12,55]. A bigger variance of Alice’s signal will result in a higher
amount of shared bits between Alice and Bob.
We have analysed the case when Bob measures the amplitude quadrature X .
The net information when Bob measures the phase quadrature would follow in a
similar manner.
12.3 A lossy channel
We now consider the effects of transmission losses in the channel between Alice
and Bob. We characterise the loss by the transmission coefficient η. The loss can
be modelled by a beam splitter with transmission η. Alice’s coherent state enters
the first port of the beam splitter while the vacuum state enters the second port as
in figure 11.1.
From section 11.1.1, the output of the beam splitter would be related to the
input by





That is, Bob will still receive a coherent state, but its amplitude is attenuated to
√ηα. Bob’s outcome is less correlated to the signal Alice sends when there is
loss. The conditional probability of Bob to get the outcome xB is now
pB(xB|xA)∼N (
√ηxA,σV ) , (12.24)
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and the covariance matrix between Alice’s and Bob’s data C is
C =

 σ2A √ησ2A√ησ2A σ2V +ησ2A

 . (12.25)





















From the other port of the beam splitter, Eve receives the coherent state
∣∣√1−ηα〉.


















Figure 12.1 shows the mutual information between Alice and Bob IAB and Eve’s
information IE as a function of the transmission η. The information between
Alice and Bob will always be greater than the information between Alice and Eve
as long as η > 0.5. In this region, Alice and Bob can still extract a secure key.
Provided η > 0.5, Alice and Bob can get arbitrarily large information by making
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Figure 12.1: Plot of Alice–Eve’s mutual information (in blue) and Alice–Bob’s
mutual information (in red) for a coherent state protocol without post-selection as
a function of the transmission rate η. The two curves intersect at η = 0.5. For
η > 0.5, Eve always has more information than Alice and Bob. The plots are re-





For example at η = 0.3 and σ2A = 100σ2V , the mutual information between Alice
and Bob is 3.075 bits per signal while Alice and Eve has a mutual information of
2.477 bits per signal. Since Alice and Bob has more information than Alice and
Eve, secure communication is still possible at this point.
the variance σ2A large. However once η < 0.5, Eve will gain too much information
and the protocol is no longer secure. This is the origin of the 3 dB limit.
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Chapter 13
Introduction to the protocol
The protocol that we shall study was first presented by Silberhorn, Ralph, Lu¨tken-
haus and Leuchs in 2002 [52]. In this protocol, Alice sends a coherent state |α〉 to
Bob. Bob measures either the real or imaginary part of α. Bob will announce the
measurement basis he used as well as the absolute value of the measurement re-
sult. Alice subsequently announces the absolute value of the real or imaginary part
of α depending on which measurement Bob performed. With this information,
Alice and Bob will share a binary symmetric channel with some error probability
that they can estimate.
Alice and Bob can also estimate the transmission and noise characteristics of
the channel. From this, they can estimate how much information an eavesdropper
can gain. Alice and Bob then perform post-selection. If the eavesdropper has more
information than Bob, then the data point is discarded, otherwise it is kept. By
doing post-selection, Alice and Bob can overcome the 3 dB limit of the Grosshans
and Grangier 2002 protocol [23].
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In the perfect channel with transmission η = 1, this protocol would be less
efficient than the Grosshans and Grangier 2002 protocol. In this protocol, ev-
ery coherent state Alice sent can give at best just one bit of information. In the
Grosshans and Grangier 2002 protocol, if the transmission is greater than half,
Alice can choose a large variance σA of the Gaussian distribution of the coher-
ent states to send and potentially extract an arbitrarily large length of key from a
single coherent state.
However if the transmission is less than half, the Grosshans and Grangier 2002
protocol would fail to yield any key whereas this protocol will still give a positive
key rate up to certain noise threshold.
In section 13.1, we give a formal description of the protocol as well as how Al-
ice and Bob estimate the channel parameters. Next, section 13.2 gives the protocol
for extracting the keys from the raw data. Finally, in section 13.3, we shall calcu-
late the mutual information between Alice and Bob as a function of the channel
parameters.
13.1 The protocol








for j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}.
Both x jA and y
j
A are picked from a Gaussian distribution with variance σ2A and
mean zero
pA(xA)∼N (0,σA) , (13.1)
pA(yA)∼N (0,σA) . (13.2)
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Alice then prepares a sequence of N coherent states
∣∣α j〉 with the complex ampli-
tudes α j = x jA + iy
j
A.
Bob will then choose to measure each coherent state with either the amplitude
operator X or the phase operator Y . If the transmission channel between Alice
and Bob was perfect, then when Bob measures X given that Alice sends xA, the
outcome of Bob’s measurement will have a Gaussian distribution with mean xA
and variance σ2V .
However with a lossy and noisy transmission channel with a Gaussian noise,
the outcome of Bob’s measurement will have a mean of √ηxA and a variance
(1+δ)σ2V where η characterises the loss and δ characterises the excess noise. The





Before proceeding with the key generation, Alice and Bob will use some mea-
surement results to characterise the channel. They check that their data is indeed
consistent with the expected probability distributions up to some confidence level.
They check that for the amplitude quadrature, their joint probability pAB (xA,xB)
is Gaussian with mean (x¯A, x¯B) = (0,0) and covariance matrix
C =


















where~x = (xA,xB). Otherwise the protocol fails and is aborted. If the probability
is consistent, the three parameters of the channel—σA, η and δ—can be obtained









= (1+δ)σ2V +ησ2A . (13.9)
Alice and Bob will repeat the same characterisation for the phase quadrature.
In the next step of the protocol, Bob announces the quadrature she measured,
either X or Y as well as the absolute value of his measurement result. If Bob
announces that he measured X , Alice will reveal the absolute value of xA and
if Bob announces that he measured Y , Alice will reveal the absolute value of yA.
Each pair of absolute values (|xA| , |xB|) and (|yA| , |yB|) constitute a binary channel
between Alice and Bob.
13.2 Key extraction
When Bob measures in the X quadrature, for a given signal that Alice sends xA
and measurement outcome xB, the raw key between Alice and Bob is given by
the parity of xA and xB. We denote the absolute values of xA and xB by sA = |xA|
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and mB = |xB| respectively. If Bob measures in the phase quadrature, then it will
be the imaginary parts that we shall be interested in. In this case, using the same
symbols, we denote sA = |yA| and mB = |yB|. The following table gives an example
of a set of ten signals and outcomes from a hypothetical experiment with η = 0.5,




signal, α quadrature outcome bits
0.87+0.90i X 1.16 1.16 0.87 (+,+)
1.81+1.89i Y 0.16 0.16 1.89 (+,+)
−1.57+4.23i X −0.70 0.70 1.57 (−,−)
−1.23−1.30i Y −0.57 0.57 1.30 (−,−)
0.80+0.60i X −0.30 0.30 0.80 (+,−)
−2.90+2.68i Y 1.03 1.03 2.68 (+,+)
1.98−1.03i Y 0.09 0.09 1.03 (−,+)
−1.37−0.21i Y −1.34 1.34 0.21 (−,−)
1.16+0.67i X 0.60 0.60 1.16 (+,+)
3.77−3.11i X 3.60 3.60 3.77 (+,+)
In this example, the fifth and seventh data points contain errors.
Even in a perfect transmission channel with η = 1, this binary channel will
not be perfect. There will be error when Alice sends a positive signal sA but Bob
measures a negative outcome −mB or when Alice sends a negative signal −sA but













which is 1/2 when the product sAmB = 0 and goes to zero for large sAmB. This
means that the channel is better for larger values of sAmB. The probability distri-
bution between Alice and Bob for the channel is given by the following table.
Alice’s signal








13.3 Mutual information between Alice and Bob
From the binary symmetric probability table between Alice and Bob, we can cal-


























= 1+ perror log perror +(1− perror) log(1− perror) (13.14)
= Φ(1−2perror) (13.15)
where Φ(x) = [(1+ x) log(1+ x)+(1− x) log(1− x)]/2. Depending on whether
the information between Alice and Bob is greater or the information that Eve can
gain is greater, the channel will be selected or not selected. Only the data from the
selected channel will be used in the key generation.
The final key rate between Alice and Bob is obtained by integrating the differ-
ence between Alice and Bob’s information and Eve’s information IAB(sA,mB)−
IE(sA,mB) weighted by the probabilities pAB(sA,mB) over the post-selected re-
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gion. For a given η and δ, this net information would depend on the post-selected
region as well as the distribution of Alice’s signal.
The regions to be post-selected are those in which Alice and Bob have a higher
mutual information than Alice and Eve or Bob and Eve. To proceed we shall need




Eve’s information without thermal
noise
Before proceeding to the general case with transmission loss and noisy channel,
we recap and elaborate some results for the case of transmissions in lossy channels
without excess noise as presented in [52].
Section 14.1 introduces the scenario we will be analysing. In section 14.2,
we calculate the mutual information between Alice and Bob after post-selection
for a channel with vacuum noise. Section 14.3 analyses the security of the pro-
tocol under individual attacks. Finally, section 14.4 repeats the same analysis for
collective attacks.
14.1 Post-selection without thermal noise
We are going to study the security of the protocol in a lossy quantum channel
between Alice and Bob. Alice sends the coherent state |α〉 with α = xA + iyA. In
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a lossy but not noisy channel, when Bob repeatedly measures the amplitude and
phase quadratures on different copies of the state that she receives, the outcome
of Bob’s measurement will still have variance σ2V but the mean values will now be
(〈X〉α ,〈Y 〉α) = (
√ηxA,√ηyA).
The channel between Alice and Bob is modelled by a beam splitter with trans-
mittivity η where a vacuum state |0〉 enters through the unused port of the beam
splitter. For every α, because the variance of Bob’s measurement is σ2V , Bob is
certain that he has a pure state. Bob knows that he has the coherent state
∣∣√ηα〉
and not something else.
However, in the noisy case, when the variances of Bob’s quadrature measure-
ments are greater than σ2V , Bob will not know for certain the state he received
because, by only measuring the X and Y quadratures, he is not doing a complete
tomography of the state. For example, he would not be able to unambiguously
reconstruct the state’s Wigner function. To do that he would have to measure all
quadrature angles.
We attribute the loss in the channel to the actions of an adversary Eve. In the
beam splitter model, the second output of the beam splitter is kept by Eve. Hence,
for the input state |α〉, Eve will keep state ∣∣√1−ηα〉 in her record.
14.2 Mutual information between Alice and Eve
As the protocol goes, Bob will then announce the quadrature that he measures and
the absolute value of his measurement result. Suppose Bob chose the X quadra-
ture as his measurement basis. Then he will announce mB = |xB|. Subsequently
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Alice announces the absolute value of her signal corresponding to the measured
quadrature. In this case, Alice will announce the value of sA = |xA|.
Eve would like to gain as much information as she can regarding the value of
Alice’s signal in the chosen quadrature, in this case the X quadrature. She would
not be interested in the Y quadrature value as that value will not be used in the key
generation at all.
After Alice’s announcement of sA, Eve will know that Alice encoded either
sA or −sA onto the amplitude quadrature. The parity of this encoding provides
the raw key. Since Eve does not know the value of Alice’s encoding in the phase
quadrature yA, her input states are then two mixed states obtained by integrating




∣∣∣√1−η(±sA + iyA)〉〈√1−η(±sA + iyA)∣∣∣ .
(14.1)
Here pA (yA) is the probability for Alice to encode the signal yA in the phase
quadrature. To obtain an upper bound on Eve’s information, we provide Eve with
the actual value of yA. Clearly, we are providing Eve with more power than she
originally has. In this case, Eve’s input state will be the two pure states
|ψE (±sA,yA)〉=
∣∣∣√1−η(±sA + iyA)〉 . (14.2)
For this input state, we shall find the amount of information Eve can obtain by
doing individual attacks (in section 14.3) and collective attacks (in section 14.4).
Both values depend only on the overlap between the two input states. The overlap
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between the two states is
f = ∣∣〈ψE (+sA) ∣∣ψE (−sA)〉∣∣= exp(−2s2A (1−η)) (14.3)
which does not depend on yA as one would expect.
14.3 Post-selection: Individual attack, without ther-
mal noise
In this section, we consider the case where Eve carries out an individual attack.
14.3.1 Information difference
The maximum information Eve can learn when she performs an individual attack
is given by the accessible information of Eve’s input states. In this case Eve’s input
state that she can measure to attack Alice or Bob would be |ψE (±sA)〉, which
does not depend on Bob’s measurement results. Using the result for accessible
information for two pure input states in section 2.4.1, we find that Eve’s accessible
information is





where f = exp(−2s2A (1−η)) is the absolute value of the inner product between
Eve’s input states. Figure 14.1 plots Eve’s information against xA for transmission
η = 0.5. When Alice announces that the value of sA is very large, Eve is very
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Figure 14.1: A bound for the mutual information between Alice and Eve for a
noiseless coherent state protocol with channel transmission η = 0.5 as a function
of Alice’s signal when Eve is limited to individual attacks. The information does
not depend on Bob’s measurement outcome.
confident that she can guess correctly Alice’s bit. However when sA is close to
zero, Eve has very little information on Alice’s bit.
From equation (13.15), we found that the mutual information between Alice
and Bob was
IAB = Φ(1−2perror) (14.5)



















































Figure 14.2: Mutual information between Alice and Bob are shown as contours
for a noiseless coherent state protocol with channel transmission η = 0.5 as a
function of Alice’s signal and Bob’s measurement result.
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14.3.2 Post-selection region
The regions to be post-selected are those in which Alice and Bob have more in-
formation than Eve. The difference between the information as a function of xA
and xB is plotted in figure 14.3. This difference gives the theoretical limit for the
key rate. Data points that fall in the post-selected region would contribute to the
raw key generation. We see that the points having very large values of xB and rel-
atively small values of xA give Alice and Bob a high information advantage over
Eve. However, as the joint probability distribution is far from its maximum here,
we don’t expect that the majority of the data points to fall here.
The post-selected region is defined as the region where
IAB > IindE (14.7)







1− f 2 . (14.9)

























































Figure 14.3: Contour plot of the difference in information between Alice–Bob
and Alice–Eve for a noiseless coherent state protocol with channel transmission
η = 0.5 when Eve does individual attacks. The difference in information is plot-
ted as a function of Alice’s signal and Bob’s measurement outcome. The post-
selected regions, coloured in green, are those in which the difference is positive.
The red and blue dots are 5000 randomly simulated data points with Alice send-
ing randomly distributed coherent states having mean zero and variance 3σ2V . In
the protocol, those data points lying outside the post-selected region will not be




Now that we know the key rate that each effective channel (sA,mB) provides, we
want our distribution of data points to be such that it gives us the maximum key
rate. We want a lot of points to fall in the high key rate region and not too many
in the discarded region.
Alice can decide what states to send to Bob. For a particular value of xA that
she sends, Bob will obtain an outcome xB with a probability pB (xB|xA), which
is normally distributed with mean √ηxA and variance (1 + δ)σ2V . For a given









where ΩI>0 is the post-selected region. The key rate is plotted as a function of sA
in figure 14.4. From the plot, we find that the key rate is maximum when Alice’s
signal has the value sA = 0.71.
In principle, Alice could just send the coherent states with xA = ±0.71 and
this would give a key rate rate between Alice and Bob of 0.1260 bits per signal.
But in practice it would be easier for Alice to send coherent states with a Gaussian
distribution rather than switching between some discrete set of coherent states.





























Figure 14.4: A plot of the key rate between Alice and Bob for a noiseless coherent
state protocol with channel transmission η = 0.5 after doing post-selection as a
function of Alice’s signal when Eve does an individual attack. The maximum
key rate occurs when Alice sends sA = 0.71 for which the maximum key rate
extractable would be 0.1260 bits per signal.
is maximum. Here pA is Alice’s signal distribution having mean zero and vari-
ance σ2A. This integration can be computed numerically. Some values of rindk cor-
responding to some chosen values of the variance σ2A are given in the following
table:





These values are plotted in figure 14.9 which shows the variation of rk as a func-
tion of the variance σ2A. The maximum key rate is 0.06644 bits per signal when
σ2A = 0.51. This is the variance that Alice should use to maximise her key rate.
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Figure 14.5: A plot of the key rate between Alice and Bob for a noiseless coherent
state protocol with channel transmission η = 0.5 after doing post-selection as a
function of Alice’s signal variance σ2A when Alice sends a Gaussian distribution.
This figure is for individual attacks by Eve. The x-axis is normalised so that the
vacuum state has a variance σ2V = 0.25. The maximum is when σ2A = 0.51 for
which the attainable key rate is 0.06644 bits per signal.
14.3.4 Optimal variance and key rate
For different values of transmission η, the optimal variances for Alice and the
maximum key rates Alice and Bob can get are summarised in the following table.
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The key rate goes to zero as the transmission η goes to zero. But in principle, it is
always positive for all η > 0.
14.4 Post-selection: Collective attack, without ther-
mal noise
In this section, we repeat the same analysis done in the previous section but for a
collective attack.
14.4.1 Information difference
When Eve does a collective attack, the maximum information she can gain is
given by the Holevo bound. After providing Eve the additional information about
Alice’s signal in the unmeasured quadrature, Eve’s input states are just two pure
states. For these two pure state inputs |ψE (±sA)〉, we found from section 2.4.2
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Figure 14.6: A bound for the mutual information between Alice and Eve for a
noiseless coherent state protocol with channel transmission η = 0.5 as a function
of Alice’s signal in a collective attack. The information does not depend on Bob’s
measurement outcome.
that the Holevo bound gives Eve’s maximum information to be
IcolE (sA) = 1−Φ( f ) (14.15)
where f = exp(−2s2A(1−η)) is the overlap between Eve two inputs. Figure 14.6
plots Eve’s information against xA for transmission η = 0.5. When Alice an-
nounces that the value of sA is very large, Eve is very confident that she can guess
correctly Alice’s bit. However when sA is close to zero, Eve has very little infor-
mation on Alice’s bit.
The information between Alice and Bob depends only on the channel param-
eters. It does not depend on the type of attack that Eve does. As long as these
parameters are the same, the mutual information between Alice and Bob is still
IAB = Φ(1− perror), the same as in section 14.3.1 when Eve does an individual
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attack. This mutual information between Alice and Bob for transmission η = 0.5
was plotted in figure 14.2.
14.4.2 Post-selection region
The difference between the mutual information between Alice and Bob and Eve’s
information is plotted in the contour plot in figure 14.7. Positive values of this
difference gives the maximum theoretical limit for the key rate at that point. The
points with positive key rate would be post-selected. Only data points that fall in
the post-selected region would contribute to the raw key generation.
The post-selected region is defined by the region with
IAB > IcolE (14.16)
=⇒ Φ(1−2perror) > 1−Φ( f ) . (14.17)
14.4.3 Alice’s distribution
Now that we have the key rate that each effective channel (sA,mB) provides, we
want our distribution of points to be such that it give us the maximum net key rate.
We want a lot of points to be in the high key rate region and not too many in the
discarded region.
Alice can decide what states to send to Bob. For a particular value of xA that
she sends, Bob will obtain an outcome xB with a probability pB (xB|xA), which































Figure 14.7: Contour plot of the difference in information between Alice–Bob
and Alice–Eve for a noiseless coherent state protocol with channel transmission
η = 0.5 when Eve does collective attacks. The difference in information is plotted
as a function of Alice’s signal and Bob’s measurement outcome. The post-selected
region, coloured in green, are those in which the difference is positive. The red
dots are 5000 randomly simulated data points with Alice sending randomly dis-
tributed coherent states having mean zero and variance 3σ2V . In the protocol, those
data points lying outside the post-selected region will not be included in the key-
extraction scheme. The gradient of the blue line gives the ratio σB/σA.
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Figure 14.8: A plot of the key rate between Alice and Bob for a noiseless coherent
state protocol with channel transmission η = 0.5 after doing post-selection as a
function of Alice’s signal when Eve does a collective attack. The maximum key
rate occurs when Alice sends sA = 0.67 for which the key rate would be 0.04819
bits per signal.









where ΩI>0 is the post-selected region. The key rate is plotted in figure 14.8.
From the graph, we see that the key rate is maximum when sA = 0.67.
In principle, Alice could just use the value of sA = 0.67 and send the signals
having xA = ±0.67. This would give a key rate rate of 0.04819 bits per signal.
But in practice it would easier for Alice to send coherent states with a Gaussian
distribution rather than switching between some discrete set of coherent states.
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is maximum. This integration can be computed numerically. Some values of rcolk
corresponding to some chosen values of the variance σ2A are given in the following
table:





These values are plotted in figure 14.9 which shows the variation of rcolk as a
function of the variance σ2A. The key rate attains a maximum value of 0.02445
bits per signal when σ2A = 0.46. This is the variance that Alice should use to
maximise the key rate.
14.4.4 Optimal variance and key rate
For different values of transmission η, the optimal variances for Alice and the
maximum key rates for Alice and Bob are summarised in the following table:
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Figure 14.9: A plot of the key rate between Alice and Bob for a noiseless coherent
state protocol with channel transmission η = 0.5 after doing post selection as a
function of Alice’s signal variance σ2A when Alice sends a Gaussian distribution.
This figure is for collective attacks by Eve. The vacuum state has a variance
σ2V = 0.25. The maximum is when σ2A = 0.46 for which the attainable key rate is
0.02445 bits per signal.
η σ2A Key rate rcolk
0 – 0










The key rate goes to zero as the transmission η goes to zero. But it remains
positive for all values of η > 0.
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Chapter 15
Post-selection with thermal noise
We now return to the case when the transmission channel between Alice and Bob
is both lossy and noisy. In the previous chapter, we have seen that the coherent
state post-selection protocol can tolerate loss in the channel when there is no ex-
cess noise. However in any practical implementations of the protocol, there will
be some excess noise in the channel.
By a noisy channel with excess noise, we mean that when Alice sends the co-
herent state |α〉 with α = xA + iyA, Bob will not receive a coherent state. Instead,
when Bob measures the amplitude and phase quadratures, he will find the mean
values to be (〈XB〉α ,〈YB〉α) = (
√ηxA,√ηyA) and both measurements to have vari-
ances var(XB)α = var(YB)α = (1+δ)σ2V where δ≥ 0 is the excess noise and η is
the channel transmission. In this analysis, we assume that the excess noise in the
amplitude and phase quadratures are equal. If they are not equal up to some tol-
erance, Alice and Bob abort the protocol. Precisely what that tolerance should be
would depend on the security level Alice and Bob desire and the uncertainties in
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parameterising their channel. The details of these considerations would require
further studies beyond the scope of this thesis.
In this chapter, we want to study the performance of the protocol in the pres-
ence of excess noise. Some results from this chapter have been published else-
where [1, 54]. The effects of excess noise on the security of coherent state quan-
tum cryptography were also discussed by Heid and Lu¨tkenhaus [25].
Section 15.1 gives the input states that Eve receives that she will use to learn
something about Alice and Bob’s communication. Section 15.2 gives bounds on
Eve’s information for individual and collective attacks on Alice. Section 15.3
looks at the case when Eve does her attacks on Bob. Section 15.4 discusses
whether it would be advantageous for Alice and Bob to do forward reconcilia-
tion or reverse reconciliation. Section 15.5 gives the noise threshold for secure
key distribution in both individual and collective attacks.
15.1 Eve’s input states
We want to bound Eve’s information on Alice and Bob’s bits when we restrict Eve
to a Gaussian attack. Before doing that, we shall find out what are the restrictions
on Eve’s input states. Once again, we model Eve’s eavesdropping via a beam
splitter with a mixed state entering through one of the ports. The situation is
depicted in figure 15.1.
The checks that Alice and Bob do would impose some restrictions on the
Gaussian state that enters through the vacuum port aVin . Since the state that Bob re-
ceives at aB must have the same variances in the amplitude and phase quadratures,









Figure 15.1: Beam splitter loss model for Eve’s eavesdropping in the coherent
state protocol with thermal noise. Alice sends a coherent state |α〉 = |xA + iyA〉
into aA, the first port of a beam splitter with transmission η. A Gaussian state
from Eve enters the second port at aVin . This state has variance σ2th in both the X
and Y quadratures. The state Bob receives at the output aB is another Gaussian
state with variances (1 + δ)σ2v in the X and Y quadratures and a mean amplitude
of √ηxA + i√ηyA.
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with mean zero. We denote the variances in the X and Y quadratures of aVin by
var(XVin) = var(YVin) = σ2th.
The variance of the thermal state through aVin is related to the excess noise at
Bob’s output by
ησ2V +(1−η)σ2th = (1+δ)σ2V , (15.1)








From section 11.4, the variances along the X and Y quadratures are related to vari-





2 θin +σ2in+ sin2 θin = σ2th , (15.3)
var(YVin) = σ
2
in− sin2 θin +σ2in+ cos2 θin = σ2th , (15.4)
where θin is the quadrature angle corresponding to minimum variance quadrature.








= σ2th . (15.5)
Additionally, in order to satisfy the Heisenberg uncertainty relation, we must have
σin−σin+ ≥ σ2V . The acceptable range of σ2in− and σ2in+ is shown as the black line

























Figure 15.2: Plot showing the acceptable Gaussian states that Eve can send into
the vacuum port of the beam splitter loss model in the coherent state protocol with








= σ2th. The quadrature squeezing angles for these states must be
θin = pi/4. The blue line corresponds to pure states where σin−σin+ = σ2V . The two
blue dots corresponds to Eve injecting a 45 degrees pure squeezed state through
the vacuum port. At the red dot, Eve injects a thermal state, which could be
entangled to a second thermal state. The area shaded yellow are states that are not
physical as they would violate Heisenberg uncertainty relation.
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σ2in− = (1− ε)σ2th , (15.6)
σ2in+ = (1+ ε)σ2th . (15.7)
This line intersects the Heisenberg uncertainty limit when
σin−σin+ = σ2V (15.8)
=⇒
√






















The two end points of the line correspond to two pure squeezed states. At ε =
0, the noise corresponds to that of a true thermal state with equal noise in all
quadratures. Eve would be restricted to using states at this point if Alice and Bob
could do a complete characterisation of the channel.
15.1.1 The input and output states
We let Eve create the thermal state entering the quantum channel at aVin by mixing
two orthogonally squeezed states through a 50/50 beam splitter. The thermal state
created will be correlated to another thermal state which Eve is free to keep and



















Figure 15.3: Beam splitter model for the creation of Eve’s eavesdropping thermal
state in the coherent state protocol with thermal noise. Eve’s thermal state is
created by injecting two pure squeezed state through a 50/50 beam splitter. The
rest of the model remains the same. Alice sends a coherent state into aA, the
first port of a beam splitter with transmission η. Eve’s noisy Gaussian state with
variance σ2th in the amplitude and phase quadratures enters the second port at aVin .
The state Bob receives at the output aB is another noisy Gaussian state.
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The three inputs are Alice’s coherent state at aA and Eve’s two squeezed states
at aV1 and aV2 . The Wigner function for Alice’s coherent state is centred at
~xA = (xA,yA) (15.12)































sinθ2 cosθ2 σ22− sin2 θ2 +σ22+ cos2 θ2

 (15.15)
where σ1−σ1+ = σ2V and σ2−σ2+ = σ2V and the angles θ1 and θ2 are the squeezed
quadratures. As Bob checks that the variances in both his quadratures are equal,






















σ22− sin2 θ2 +σ22+ cos2 θ2
)]
= σ2th . (15.17)
For a fixed value of θ1 and θ2, these constraints determine a unique value (up to
permutations) of the squeezed variances σ1− and σ2−.
Since xA and yA are not correlated, it is reasonable to choose θ1 = 0 and θ2 =
pi/2 and treat the two quadratures independently. With this choice, we have σ1− =












σ2V 0 0 0 0 0
0 σ2V 0 0 0 0
0 0 σ21− 0 0 0
0 0 0 σ21+ 0 0
0 0 0 0 σ22+ 0




Since the X and Y quadratures are uncorrelated throughout the protocol, we
restrict the analysis to only the X quadrature. That is, we assume that Bob mea-
sured the X quadrature. The action of the two beam splitters on the X quadrature
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Hence, when Alice sends the coherent state with real amplitude xA the output state





































































































































Now in the protocol, Bob will announce the absolute value of his measurement
result. At this point, we can find out what is Eve’s reduced state if Bob measured
the outcome xB by taking the conditioned Gaussian state after conditioning on
Bob’s outcome. But it turns out the computation will be easier if we not do so yet.
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We shall keep the output state as a three-mode Gaussian state between Eve and
Bob.
15.1.2 Eve’s reduced input
After Alice announces the absolute value of her signal sA = |xA| and Bob an-
nounces the absolute value of his measurement outcome mB = |xB|, Eve knows
that the reduced state she holds will be in one of the four possible states
{|ψE (+sA,+mB)〉 , |ψE (+sA,−mB)〉 , |ψE (−sA,+mB)〉 , |ψE (−sA,−mB)〉}
with probabilities we denote by
{pE(+,+), pE(+,−), pE(−,+), pE(−,−)} .
For example, the probability that Eve has the state |ψE(+sA,−mB)〉 would be
pE(+,−) = pB (−mB|+ sA)N (15.29)
where pB(xB|xA) is the probability density corresponding to Bob measuring the
outcome xB given that Alice sent the signal xA which is given in section 13.1. N is
the normalisation
N = pB (+mB|+ sA)+ pB (+mB|− sA)
+ pB (−mB|+ sA)+ pB (−mB|− sA)
(15.30)
so that pE(+,+)+ pE(+,−)+ pE(−,+)+ pE(−,−) = 1.
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We normalise the states that Eve receives with
〈
ψE(xA,xB)
∣∣ψE(xA,xB)〉= pB (xB|xA) . (15.31)
The overlap between any two of Eve’s input states can be computed by evaluating







The details of the integration can be found in appendix E. Here we just collect the








































Finally the inner product between the cross terms for matched and unmatched

















These inner products define the structure of Eve’s input states which will be given
in the next two sections.
15.2 Bounding Eve’s information when Eve attacks
Alice





+ |ψE (+sA,−mB)〉〈ψE (+sA,−mB)|)
(15.36)
and
ρE(−sA) = 1N (|ψE (−sA,+mB)〉〈(−sA,+mB)|
+ |ψE (−sA,−mB)〉〈(−sA,−mB)|)
(15.37)
with equal probabilities and where the normalisation
N = pB (+mB|+ sA)+ pB (+mB|− sA)
+ pB (−mB|+ sA)+ pB (−mB|− sA) .
(15.38)
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The two states are normalised such that
Tr{ρE(+sA)}= Tr{ρE(−sA)}= 12 . (15.39)
Each of these states are of rank two and together they occupy a four dimensional
space. To represent the input states in some numerical basis, we need to evalu-




we have a representation for the states, it is easy to calculate the Holevo quantity
to get an upper bound on Eve’s information for collective attacks or somewhat
harder, the accessible information to get a bound on Eve’s information for indi-
vidual attacks.
While these quantities would give a tight bound on Eve’s information, here we
are interested in a bound that can be easily computed. For that purpose, we shall
give Eve some additional information. We tell Eve whether Alice and Bob have
matching parity or mismatched parity. With this information, with probability




Eve would have to distinguish between the two equally likely pure states
|ψE (+sA,+mB)〉 and |ψE (−sA,−mB)〉. Also, with probability




Eve would have to distinguish between the two equally likely pure states
|ψE (+sA,−mB)〉 and |ψE (−sA,+mB)〉. Now that Eve only distinguishes between
two pure states, the information she gains can be written down explicitly. From
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while for collective attacks, Holevo’s bound gives
IcolEA (sA,mB)≤ p1 (1−Φ( f1))+ p2 (1−Φ( f2)) (15.43)
where f1 and f2 are the normalised overlaps
f1 =
∣∣〈ψE (sA,mB) ∣∣ψE (−sA,−mB)〉∣∣〈
ψE (sA,mB)
∣∣ψE (sA,mB)〉 , (15.44)
f2 =
∣∣〈ψE (sA,−mB) ∣∣ψE (−sA,mB)〉∣∣〈
ψE (sA,−mB)
∣∣ψE (sA,−mB)〉 . (15.45)
The inner products in the numerators and denominators of f1 and f2 were quan-
tities that are given in section 15.1.2. That IEA is an upper bound is clear since
this is the maximum amount of information Eve can obtain if she uses the par-
ity match–mismatch announcements. Ignoring these announcements would only
reduce Eve’s ability to gain information.
Eve’s information bound depends on the channel excess noise and transmis-
sion. For excess noise δ = 0.2 and transmission η = 0.5, this bound for individual
and collective attacks are plotted in figures 15.4 and 15.5 respectively. In both
cases, Eve’s information becomes progressively larger as sA and mB increases.
When either sA or mB is larger than 2.0, Eve’s information is already very close to





































Figure 15.4: Contour plot of Eve’s information bound for individual attacks in the
coherent state protocol with excess noise. The amount of excess noise is δ = 0.2
and the channel transmission is η = 0.5. Eve’s information is plotted as a function





































Figure 15.5: Contour plot of Eve’s information bound for collective attacks in the
coherent state protocol with excess noise. The amount of excess noise is δ = 0.2
and the channel transmission is η = 0.5. Eve’s information is plotted as a function
of Alice’s signal and Bob’s measurement outcome.
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15.3 Bounding Eve’s information when Eve attacks
Bob
Instead of attacking Alice, Eve could instead choose to attack Bob. In this case,





+ |ψE (−sA,+mB)〉〈ψE (−sA,+mB)|)
(15.46)
and
ρE(−mB) = 1N (|ψE (+sA,−mB)〉〈(+sA,−mB)|
+ |ψE (−sA,−mB)〉〈(−sA,−mB)|)
(15.47)
both having equal probability. By repeating a similar analysis that was done for
the case when Eve attacks Alice, we can get a bound on Eve’s information for











while for collective attacks, Holevo’s bound gives
IcolEB (sA,mB)≤ p1 (1−Φ( f1))+ p2 (1−Φ( f2)) , (15.49)
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which are the same expressions that were obtained when Eve attacks Alice. So
with the additional information on whether Alice and Bob’s bits match or not, it
does not matter whether Eve attacks Alice or Bob.
15.4 Direct or reverse reconciliation
However in practice, Eve does not have the parity match–mismatch information
and the actual accessible information or Holevo quantity when Eve attacks Alice
and when Eve attacks Bob would in general be different. They would only be























Along this line Eve can get exactly the same information from Alice as she can








Alice would announce a relatively big value of sA compared to Bob’s announced
mB. In that case Eve shares more information with Alice than with Bob. Hence
it would be more advantageous if Alice and Bob do reverse reconciliation. That
is, we use Bob’s raw key as a reference and Alice corrects her keys to match
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Bob’s. The one way post-processing is done by Bob sending classical information
through the public channel.
Outside this region, Eve has more information about Bob’s raw key than about
Alice’s raw key. So direct reconciliation, where now Alice’s raw key is used as a
reference, would give Alice and Bob a higher key rate.
For the bounds derived in this thesis, we recall that Eve’s information with
Alice is the same as her information with Bob. Hence the results on the bounds
on the key rates will be valid regardless of whether Alice and Bob do a direct
reconciliation or a reverse reconciliation.
15.5 Noise threshold
As long as there are some values of sA and mB such that Alice and Bob share more
information compared to Eve’s information, there will a non-empty post-selection
region and in principle the key rate would be positive.
For a fixed transmission rate, as the excess noise increases, the size of the post-
selection region will reduce. Beyond some noise threshold, Eve’s information will
become greater than Alice and Bob’s information for all values of sA and mB. For
example, when δ > 2η, the state between Alice and Bob becomes separable. In
this case, Eve can do a classical intercept and resend attack for which IE > IAB for
all values of sA and mB [38].
To find the noise threshold, we shall solve for the curve where the bound on
Eve’s information is equal to Alice and Bob’s information
IE = IAB . (15.54)
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Since at the noise threshold, Eve’s information will be greater than Alice and
Bob’s for all values of sA and mB, we can consider the case when sA is large.



















=⇒ p1  p2 . (15.57)
This means that when sA  1, Alice and Bob will most likely get correlated bits.
Eve practically just has to distinguish between the two pure states |ψE (sA,mB)〉






and for collective attacks, it will be
IcolE ≈ 1−Φ( f1) (15.59)
where f1 is the properly normalised inner product between Eve’s most likely input
as given in equation (15.44). The approximation gets better with larger sA.
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15.5.1 Individual attacks
Equating Eve’s information to Alice and Bob’s information, we find that for indi-








1− f 21 = 1−2perror . (15.61)
Since f1  1, we make the approximation
1− 1
2
f 21 ≈ 1−2perror (15.62)
=⇒ f 21 = 4perror . (15.63)
Substituting the expression for f1 from equation (15.44) and for perror from equa-

































√η(1+δ)sAmB +(1−η+δ)s2A = 0 . (15.66)
234





(2δ+δ2) sA . (15.67)
For large sA, the post-selection boundary would asymptote to these two lines.
When the term under the radical is zero, the two lines will become one and the
post-selection region becomes empty. Therefore the noise threshold δ0 is obtained
by solving for δ0 in the cubic equation
η(1+δ0)2−δ0(2+δ0)(1−η+δ0) = 0 (15.68)
=⇒ −δ30 +δ20(2η−3)+δ0(4η−2)+η = 0 . (15.69)
Solving this equation, we find that for every value of 0≤ η≤ 1, there exist exactly
one solution for δ0 that is greater than or equal to zero. This solution is plotted in
figure 15.6 as a function of η. For channels with excess noise above this line, no
secure communication is possible.
15.5.2 Collective attacks
To find the noise threshold for collective attacks, we equate Eve’s information to
Alice and Bob’s information
1−Φ( f1) = Φ(1−2perror) . (15.70)
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Figure 15.6: Plot of the excess noise threshold δ0 for secure communication as
a function for the channel transmission η for the coherent state protocol with
thermal noise. The threshold is obtained by solving equation (15.69). At η = 0.5,
the excess noise threshold is 0.4516.
Since both f1 and perror are small when sA is large, if we keep only first order





≈ 1+ 1− perror
ln2
ln(1− perror)+ perrorln2 ln perror (15.71)
=⇒ −1
2
f 21 = (1− perror) ln(1− perror)+ perror ln perror (15.72)
=⇒ −1
2







+ perror ln perror (15.73)
=⇒ −1
2
f 21 ≈−perror . (15.74)
After substituting the expressions for f1 and perror, taking log and dropping con-
stant terms, we find that this equality gives the same asymptotic behaviour of the
post-selection region as the individual attacks
(2δ+δ2)m2B−2
√η(1+δ)sAmB +(1−η+δ)s2A = 0 . (15.75)
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Hence the noise threshold for the collective attacks is the same as the noise thresh-
old for the individual attacks.
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Chapter 16
Effects of excess noise at
transmission = 0.5
In this chapter, we look in greater detail at the key rates between Alice and Bob
when their channel is contaminated by various degrees of excess noise. Sec-
tion 16.1 studies the case when Eve does an individual attack while section 16.2
gives the results for collective attacks. Both are done for a channel transmission
rate of 50%. For a single-mode fibre with an attenuation of 0.5 dB/km at a fre-
quency of 1550 nm, this would correspond to a fibre length of 6 km.
16.1 Individual attack
Using the bound on Eve’s accessible information that we had in equation (15.42)
of the previous chapter, we can now find the key rate between Alice and Bob after
post-selection.
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16.1.1 Excess noise = 0.2
We work out the details for a particular value of excess noise δ = 0.2. This is
a large excess noise compared to that typically seen in both free space and fibre
based quantum key distribution experiments which is usually less than 0.01 even
for large transmission losses [30, 36]. A large excess noise value was chosen in
this sub-section so that its effects would be more prominent.
Figure 16.1 gives a contour plot of the key rate at each point of Alice’s sig-
nal and Bob’s measured result with excess noise δ = 0.2. The key rate is given
by the difference in Alice–Bob’s mutual information, equation (13.15), and Eve’s
information, equation (15.42), for each value of Alice’s signal sA and Bob’s mea-
surement outcome mB.
For each value of Alice’s signal sA, the key rate between Alice and Bob is ob-










where ΩI>0 is the post-selection region. The key rate is plotted in figure 16.2 as
a function of sA. For values of sA below a certain threshold sA0 = 0.6613, the
key rate is exactly zero since the post-selection region is empty. For all values
of sA > sA0, the key rate will remain positive. But it becomes very small after sA
becomes too large.
In our protocol Alice’s signals follow a Gaussian distribution. The final key







































Figure 16.1: Contour plot of the key rate and post-selection region for individual
attacks in the coherent state protocol with excess noise. The amount of excess
noise is δ = 0.2 and the channel transmission is η = 0.5. The key rate is plotted as
a function of Alice’s signal and Bob’s measurement outcome. The post-selection
regions, coloured in green, are those in which the key rate is positive. The dotted
black line marks the point where Eve can gain the same amount of information
from Alice as she can from Bob. For regions below (above) this line, Eve can get
more information from Alice (Bob). The post-selection region asymptotes to the
two solid black lines.
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Figure 16.2: Plot of the key rate between Alice and Bob as a function of Alice’s
signal for the coherent state protocol with excess noise when Eve does individual
attacks. The plot is for excess noise δ = 0.2 and transmission η = 0.5. The
maximum key rate occurs when Alice sends sA = 0.98 for which the key rate
would be 0.01191 bits per signal. For values of sA < 0.6613, the post-selection
region is empty and the key rate becomes exactly zero.
rate on Alice’s variance is plotted in figure 16.3. It has a maximum value of
rindk = 0.0029990 bits per signal when σ2A = 1.15 in units where σ2V = 0.25.
16.1.2 Different values of excess noise
At η = 0.5, we find from figure 15.6 that the noise threshold for positive key rate
is δ0 = 0.4516. As the amount of excess noise increases, the post-selection region
becomes smaller. Only large values of sA and mB would yield a positive key rate.
But for large values of sA and mB, the key rate is very low. Hence we can expect
Alice’s optimal variance would increase with excess noise while the final key rate
would decrease.
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Figure 16.3: Plot of the net key rate as a function of Alice’s variance σ2A in the
coherent state protocol with excess noise when Eve does an individual attack. The
amount of excess noise is δ = 0.2 and the channel transmission is η = 0.5. The
vacuum state is normalised to σ2V = 0.25. The maximum key rate is 0.002999 bits
per signal at σ2A = 1.15.
Repeating the analysis done in the previous section for different values of
excess noise up to δ0, the optimal variances and net key rates are summarised in
the following table:










0.45 – < 10−10
0.45161 – 0
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In theory, the key rates are always positive when δ < δ0. But from a practical
point of view, for example when δ is 0.40, the key rate is already so small that the
protocol becomes impractical.
In an actual experiment, the amount of excess noise would typically not be
larger than δ = 0.05. At this value of excess noise, if Alice’s variance is chosen
to be near its optimal value, the key rate is reduced by approximately half. This
means that the protocol would still be practical despite the excess noise.
16.2 Collective attack
We repeat the analysis of the previous section for collective attacks. Everything is
similar except that we now use the Holevo bound (15.43) to bound Eve’s informa-
tion. With this, we can once again find the key rate between Alice and Bob after
post-selection.
16.2.1 Excess noise = 0.2
Again, we work out in greater detail for the case when δ = 0.2. Figure 16.4 gives
a contour plot of the key rate at each point of Alice’s signal and Bob’s measured
result when the excess noise δ = 0.2 for a collective attack.
For each value of Alice’s signal sA, the key rate between Alice and Bob is ob-
















































Figure 16.4: Contour plot of the key rate and post-selection region for collective
attacks in the coherent state protocol with excess noise. The amount of excess
noise is δ = 0.2 and the channel transmission is η = 0.5. The key rate is plotted as
a function of Alice’s signal and Bob’s measurement outcome. The post-selection
regions, coloured in green, are those in which the key rate is positive. The dotted
black line marks the point where Eve can gain the same amount of information
from Alice as she can from Bob. For regions below (above) this line, Eve can get
more information from Alice (Bob). The post-selection region asymptotes to the
two solid black lines.
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Figure 16.5: Plot of the key rate between Alice and Bob as a function of Alice’s
signal for the coherent state protocol with excess noise when Eve does individual
attacks. The plot is for excess noise δ = 0.2 and transmission η = 0.5. The
maximum key rate occurs when Alice sends sA = 1.23 for which the key rate
would be 0.000372 bits per signal. For values of sA < 0.9625, the post-selection
region is empty and the key rate becomes exactly zero.
where ΩI>0 is the post-selection region. The key rate is plotted in figure 16.5.
We see in this plot that for all values of sA below the threshold sA0 = 0.9625, the
key rate is exactly zero since the post-selection region is empty. For all values of
sA > sA0, the key rate remains positive but the actual value becomes very small as
sA becomes very large.
In our protocol Alice’s signals follow a Gaussian distribution. The final key
rate will depend on the variance of this distribution. This dependence is plotted
in figure 16.6 and it has a maximum value of rcolk = 0.0000632 bits per signal at
σ2A = 1.73 in units where σ2V = 0.25.
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Figure 16.6: Plot of the net key rate as a function of Alice’s variance σ2A in the
coherent state protocol with excess noise when Eve does a collective attack. The
amount of excess noise is δ = 0.2 and the channel transmission is η = 0.5. The
vacuum state is normalised to σ2V = 0.25. The maximum key rate is 0.0000632
bits per signal at σ2A = 1.73.
16.2.2 Different values of excess noise
At η = 0.5, we find from figure 15.6 that the noise threshold for positive key rate
is δ0 = 0.4516. Repeating the analysis done in the previous section for differ-
ent values of excess noise up to δ0, the optimal variances and net key rates are
summarised in the following table:
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0.45 – < 10−15
0.45161 – 0
In theory, the key rates would always be positive as long as δ< δ0. However in
practice, when the key rates becomes too small the protocol would be impractical.
When δ = 0.30, the key rate is already of the order 10−8.
In an actual experiment, the amount of excess noise would typically not be
larger than δ = 0.05. At this value of excess noise, if Alice’s variance is chosen
to be near its optimal value, the key rate is reduced by a factor of 3.4. This means
that the protocol would still remain practical despite the excess noise.
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Chapter 17
Conclusion and outlook for part two
In the second part of the thesis, we studied the security thresholds as well as
the key rates for the coherent state continuous variable quantum key distribution
protocol in the presence of Gaussian excess noise. By providing Eve with the
additional information on Alice’s unmeasured quadrature and whether Alice and
Bob’s raw bits match or not, we derived an upper bound on Eve’s information. We
found that the protocol can remain secure even in the presence of excess noise in
the channel.
The upper bound for collective attacks can be made tighter without giving Eve
the match–mismatch bits information. Applying Holevo’s bound directly on Eve’s
input states given in sections 15.2 and 15.3 would give us a tighter upper bound
on Eve’s information. It is worth investigating how the key rate will improve if
we use this tighter bound.
This thesis proves the security in the limit of an infinite key length where the
parameters of the channel can be found with arbitrary precision. In practice, to
do the post-processing from the raw data to the final secret keys on a very large
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string of raw bits is computationally intensive. This sets a practical limit on the
key length. Within this statistical limit, the distribution that Alice and Bob see
when they characterise their channel will never be perfectly Gaussian. The final
key rates after accounting for the finite key length would need to be investigated.
The Gaussian attack that was considered in this thesis is just one special attack
that Eve can perform while still ensuring a Gaussian joint distribution between
Alice and Bob in the measured quadratures. More generally, Eve can perform a
Gaussian attack by inserting a 45 degrees squeezed state instead of a thermal state
through the empty port of the beam splitter in figure 15.1. It remains to be seen if
this will provide Eve with more information.
Eve need not be restricted to doing a Gaussian attack. Despite doing a non-
Gaussian attack, she may still simulate a thermal noise in the channel between
Alice and Bob as long as she can engineer her attack such that the amplitude and
phase quadratures of Bob’s state remains Gaussian. To study this attack, it is not
enough just to keep track on the means and covariances of the input states as we
have done in the thesis. A more general approach would have to be used. One
way to do this would be to express the input and output states in some continuous
quadrature basis.
The effects of practical imperfections when conducting the experiment would
also reduce the actual secure key rate. For example if the quantum source from
Alice to Bob was not a single propagating spatial mode, and some of the Alice’s
signal is found in other modes of the channel, then Eve might be able to tap those
channels to gain additional information about Alice and Bob’s communications.
In the current protocol, we say that Alice and Bob will abort the protocol if
the joint distribution that they check for is not Gaussian. However we can ask if
249
the protocol remains secure if the noise that Alice and Bob see is not Gaussian. In
which direction and by how much will the key rate change if Alice and Bob get








Inner products between the
constituents of Eve’s input states
In this appendix, we shall evaluate the inner products between Eve’s reduced states
given Alice’s signal and Bob’s outcome. These states are defined in section 15.1.2
and make up Eve’s input states. The situation is depicted in figure E.1. Eve’s
four reduced sub-normalised states when Alice sends xA and Bob measures the
outcome xB are
{|ψE (+xA,+xB)〉 , |ψE (+xA,−xB)〉 , |ψE (−xA,+xB)〉 , |ψE (−xA,−xB)〉} .
We normalise the states according to
〈
ψE(xA,xB)
∣∣ψE(xA,xB)〉= pB (xB|xA) (E.1)
where pB (xB|xA) is the probability for Bob to obtain the outcome xB when Alice
















Figure E.1: The beam splitter model for the output and input states in the coher-
ent state protocol with thermal noise when Alice inputs a coherent state and Eve







+ |ψE (+xA,−xB)〉〈ψE (+xA,−xB)|)
(E.2)
and




N = pB (+xB|+ xA)+ pB (+xB|− xA)
+ pB (−xB|+ xA)+ pB (−xB|− xA)
(E.4)
and Tr{ρˆE (±xA)} = 1/2 is the probability for Eve to get either state after Alice
announces |xA| and Bob announces |xB|. All other states will be properly nor-
malised. In this appendix, we shall evaluate the inner products between the four
pure reduced states for Eve. Consider
∣∣〈ψE (xA,xB) ∣∣ψE (x′A,x′B)〉∣∣2














where ρˆE (xA,xB) is Eve’s reduced state when Alice sends xA and Bob obtains the
outcome xB. The state is properly normalised with
Tr{ρˆE (xA,xB)}= 1 . (E.6)
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Now since the partial trace can be expressed as
TrB {ρˆBE (xA) |xB〉〈xB|}= pB (xB|xA) ρˆE (xA,xB) , (E.7)
the inner product can be written as the trace
∣∣〈ψE (xA,xB) ∣∣ψE (x′A,x′B)〉∣∣2
= TrE
{






Here ρˆBE (xA) is the joint state between Bob and Eve which is the output state



























T and~yE = (yE1,yE2)
T
. We write the phase space variables
in bold in order to distinguish them from the parameters xA and xB. Also
ρBE (xA;xB,yB,~xE ,~yE) without the hat is the Wigner function corresponding to
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M is the beam splitter matrix (15.20). σ2− is the squeezed variance for Eve’s
squeezed state that makes up her EPR state. σ2+ is the variance in the orthogonal
quadrature where σ+σ− = σ2v (see figure E.1). Putting this together and integrat-
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ing over xB, we arrive at


















































































































The integration is broken up into a product of two independent integrations and we
shall perform the x integration and the y integration separately. The y integration is





































and hence the y integration can be written as
2pi~
Z













































































































































































































































































for the y integration.
E.2 x integration























































































































































































































The vector~x = (xE1,xE2)
T
. The remaining Gaussian integral can be evaluated by











































 − 1√W+Y 1√W−Y



































































































































































In the last equality, we write σ− and σ+ in terms of η and δ using the relation
(1−η)σ2th +ησ2v = (1+δ)σ2v . (E.40)
This completes the x integration.
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E.3 Putting them together
Combining the results for the y integration and the x integration, the inner product∣∣〈ψE (xA,xB) ∣∣ψE (x′A,x′B)〉∣∣2 works out to be
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